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SEISMIC PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF INTERDEPENDENT UTILITY 
NETWORK SYSTEMS 
SUMMARY 
A seismic modeling and analysis framework was implemented and utilized in this 
study to assess seismic performances of interdependent utility lifeline networks. The 
effects of interdependent behaviour and its importance on post-seismic serviceability 
considerations were emphasized and an analysis methodology to perform 
interdependent seismic performance assessment was adopted for the study. 
The methodology was implemented in an analysis software named MAEviz, which 
provides a modular and flexible environment with GIS capabilities to researchers for 
utilization of state-of-the art seismic analysis methodologies. The methodology can 
be investigated under two main parts: structural model, and topological model. 
Inventory, hazard, and fragility definitions and seismic loss assessment 
methodologies are within the scope of the structural model. Topological model is the 
part where dependency and post-seismic serviceability analyses are carried out via 
topological network connectivity and flow models. 
Several improvements and modifications in the adopted methodology were 
performed following the utilization process in order to further improve the 
interdependent failure mechanism and more accurately reflect the physical situations. 
The improvements include the addition of liquefaction-induced buried pipeline 
damage assessment algorithms and the heterogeneous dependency model to the 
interdependency structure. Heterogeneous dependency modeling enable each 
interaction between the analyzed networks behave differently instead of the 
homogeneous uniform behaviour which was previously utilized in the adopted 
analysis methodology. 
The improved methodology was applied in different case studies for the most 
populated two regions within the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) of the Central 
United States: Shelby County, Tennessee and St. Louis, Missouri. Lifeline network 
datasets of these two regions were analyzed for a 7.7-magnitude earthquake which 
was determined to be the worst-case scenario for the NMSZ. St. Louis networks were 
additionally analyzed for the Shoal Creek scenario, a 6.0-magnitude local earthquake 
in the vicinity of St. Louis.  
Effects of the implemented liquefaction-induced pipeline damage algorithms on the 
network performance were investigated for the natural gas, electric power, and water 
networks of Shelby County. Additionally, a comparison between the homogeneous 
and heterogeneous interdependency models was also carried out and documented. 
Only the heterogeneous dependency model was utilized during the analyses of St. 
Louis water and electric power networks. 
The implementation of heterogeneous dependency modeling has enabled a more 
accurate representation of the physical conditions regarding analyzed network 
xx 
 
datasets. Given the dependency levels of individual network elements, the use of 
both homogeneous and heterogeneous dependency models in the analyses result in 
determination of system dependencies of lifeline networks. The quality and accuracy 
of analysis results heavily depend on data quality. The accuracy and resolution of 
input data such as inventory and hazard contribute greatly to the certainty levels of 
assessment results. However, the accuracy and certainty of the results requires 
validation studies for the methodology, which are yet to be performed due to the 
unavailability of suitable network data and network performance information related 
to previous earthquakes. 
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KARŞIKLI BAĞIMLI ALTYAPI ŞEBEKELERİNİN SİSMİK 
PERFORMANS ANALİZİ 
ÖZET 
Çalışmada, karşılıklı bağımlı altyapı ağları için deprem sonrası hasar ve performans 
değerlendirmeleri gerçekleştirmek amacıyla bir sismik modelleme ve analiz yapısı 
ele alınmıştır. Sistemler arasındaki karşılıklı bağımlı davranış ve bu davranışın afet 
sonrası işlevsellik değerlendirmelerindeki önemi vurgulanmış, ve bu analizlerin 
gerçekleştirilebilmesi amacıyla bir analiz yöntemi benimsenmiştir. Yöntem 
dahilinde, belirlenen senaryo depremleri modellenmekte, senaryo depremine bağlı 
olarak elektrik, su ve doğal gaz şebekelelerinin yapısal hasar analizi 
gerçekleştirilmekte, yapısal hasara bağlı olarak da topolojik olarak modellenmiş 
şebekelerin deprem sonrası iş görebilirlikleri tahmin edilmektedir. 
Binalarda meydana gelen deprem hasarları, insan hayatına daha doğrudan etki ediyor 
olmaları nedeniyle daha çok dikkat çekmektedir. Ne var ki, şehir toplumlarının 
işleyişinin etkin ve sağlıklı bir şekilde sürdürülebilmesi konusunda altyapı sistemleri 
de aynı yüksek öneme sahiptir. 1988 Loma Prieta, 1994 Northridge, 1999 Marmara, 
2010 Haiti ve 2010 Şili depremleri de altyapı sistemlerinin uğradığı doğrudan ya da 
dolaylı zararlar yüzünden sekteye uğrayan müdahale ve yeniden yapılanma 
çalışmalarına örnekler sunmuşlardır. Söz konusu afetler, toplumlar için altyapı 
sistemlerinin yaşamsal önemlerini gösterdiği kadar, şebekelerin kendi aralarında 
farklı koşullarda farklı karmaşık etkileşim ve bağımlılıklara sahip olduğunu da 
göstermektedirler. Dolayısıyla, altyapı şebekelerini birbirlerinden bağımsız sistemler 
olarak incelemek yerine, bir bölgeye ait altyapı şebekelerini birbirleriyle etkileşim 
içindeki alt sistemlerden oluşan bir sistem olarak ele alacak bir yapıya ihtiyaç 
duyulmaktadır. 
Karşılıklı bağımlılık temel olarak: “İki altyapı sistemi arasında, birinin durumunun 
diğerininkini etkilediği ya da birbirleriyle ilintili olduğu karşılıklı ilişki” olarak 
tanımlanabilir. Sistem analizlerinde karşılıklı bağımlılıkların da dikkate alınması, 
altyapı sistemlerinin performanslarının belirlenmesinde doğruluk seviyesini 
yükselten bir faktördür. Araştırmacıların karşılıklı bağımlı sistem modelleri 
geliştirmelerini sağlayan etmenlerden biri, ilerleyen teknolojiyle birlikte giderek 
artan hesaplama hız ve kapasiteleridir. Daha hızlı ve güçlü bilgisayarlar, daha büyük 
şebekeleri, veri tabanlarını ve bu şebekeler arasındaki karmaşık ilişkileri basite 
indirgemeye gerek kalmadan, daha etkin yöntemlerle modellemeye olanak 
vermektedir. Çalışmada ele alınan ve iyileştirilen yöntem de, elektrik, su ve doğalgaz 
şebekeleri arasındaki bağımlılıkları mekansal analizler ve bilgisayar benzetimleri 
yardımıyla modelleyerek, altyapı şebekelerinin deprem hasarlarını ve deprem sonrası 
performanslarını tahmin etmek üzere oluşturulmuş bir analiz yöntemidir. 
Yöntem, MAEviz adlı açık kaynak kodlu bir analiz yazılımı içerisinde 
uygulanmaktadır. MAEviz, coğrafi bilgi sistemi analiz yetilerine sahip, 
araştırmacıların en güncel sismik analiz yöntemlerini tanımlayıp uygulayabilecekleri 
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modüler ve esnek yapılı bir programdır. Yöntem, yapısal ve topolojik modeller 
olmak üzere iki ana kısımda ele alınmaktadır. Envanter, afet ve kırılganlık tanımları 
ve deprem hasar analiz yöntemleri yapısal model kapsamına girmektedir. Topolojik 
modelin içeriği ise, topolojik olarak modellenmiş şebekelerin, bağlantı ve akım 
modelleri kullanılarak karşılıklı bağımlılık tanımları ve deprem sonrası performans 
ve iş görebilirlik analizlerinin gerçekleştirmesini kapsamaktadır. 
Çalışmada kullanılan analiz yönteminin belirlenmesinin ardından, karşılıklı bağımlı 
kayıp mekanizmasının iyileştirilmesi ve fiziksel durumun daha yüksek doğruluklu 
olarak yansıtılabilmesi amacıyla, benimsenen yöntem üzerinde çeşitli iyileştirmeler 
ve değişiklikler gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bahsi geçen iyileştirmeler, gömülü boru 
hatlarının yapısal hasar analizi içerisine sıvılaşma sonucu deprem hasar tahmin 
yöntemlerinin eklenmesi ve karşılıklı bağımlılık yapısına heterojen bağımlılık 
modelinin eklenmesi olarak sayılabilir. Heterojen bağımlılık modeli, incelenen 
karşılıklı bağımlı şebekeler arasındaki her etkileşimin birbirinden bağımsız olarak 
farklı davranış gösterebilmesini sağlamaktadır. Yöntemde hali hazırda kullanılmakta 
olan homojen bağımlılık modeli, tüm etkileşimleri tek bir parametreyle kontrol 
etmesinden dolayı, simulasyonlarda sistem genelinde homojen davranışlar 
göstermektedir.  
İyileştirilmiş analiz yöntemi, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin orta kesiminde bulunan 
New Madrid Sismik Zonu (NMSZ) içerisinde bulunan en kalabalık yerleşim 
bölgeleri olan Shelby County, Tennessee ve St. Louis, Missouri için gerçekleştirilen 
durum çalışmalarında uygulanmıştır. Bahsi geçen yerleşim bölgelerinin altyapı 
şebeke veri setleri, New Madrid için tahmin edilen en kötü durum senaryosu olan 7.7 
moment büyüklüğüne sahip senaryo depremi kullanılarak analiz edilmiştir. New 
Madrid senaryosuna ek olarak, St. Louis altyapı şebeke verilerinin analizi, merkez 
üssü St. Louis yakınında bulunan, Shoal Creek adlı 6.0 moment büyüklüğüne sahip 
lokal bir deprem senaryosu kullanılarak da gerçekleştirilmiştir.  
Yönteme dahil edilen sıvılaşma kaynaklı gömülü boru hattı hasar analizinin şebeke 
performansına etkileri, Shelby County’ye ait doğal gaz, elektrik ve su şebekeleri 
üzerinde incelenmiştir. Ek olarak, homojen ve heterojen bağımlılık modellerinin 
analiz sonuçlarına etkisi de karşılaştırmalı olarak incelenmiş, ve sonuçlar 
irdelenmiştir. St Louis elektrik ve su şebekelerinin karşılıklı bağımlı sismik analizi 
ise, yalnızca heterojen bağımlılık modeli kullanılarak gerçekleşmiştir. 
Geliştirilen heterojen bağımlılık modeli, üzerinde çalışılan şebeke veri setlerinde 
fiziksel yapının daha detaylı ve doğruluklu tanımlanmasını sağlamıştır. Analizler, 
şebeke elemanlarının bağımlılık dereceleri tanımlanarak gerçekleştirildiğinde, 
heterojen ve homojen modellerin ardışık olarak kullanılmasıyla elde edilen 
çıktılardan, incelenen altyapı sistemlerinin birbirlerine bağımlılıkları 
belirlenebilmektedir. Analiz sonuçlarının doğruluğu ve güvenilirliği yüksek oranda 
veri kalitesine bağlıdır. Envanter ve afet gibi kategorilere ait girdilerin doğruluk ve 
çözünürlüğü, analiz sonuçlarının güvenilirliğine doğrudan etki edebilmektedir. 
Modellenen olay, ölçeği, gerçekleşme sıklığı, ve toplumlar üzerindeki etkisi 
nedeniyle fiziksel yeryüzü üzerinde gözlemlenememekte ya da deneyler yardımıyla 
yinelenememektedir. Dolayısıyla, bilgisayar ortamında gerçekleştirilen benzetimler, 
altyapı sistemlerinin deprem hasarları ve deprem sonrası iş görebilirlik analizlerinin 
geliştirilmesi için en uygun seçenek olarak görünmektedir.  
Fiziksel dünya sayısal modellere aktarılırken kaçınılmaz olarak çeşitli basitleştirme 
ve varsayımlar yapılmaktadır. Bu varsayımlar da analizlerdeki belirsizlikleri 
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etkilemektedir. Analiz sonuçlarındaki belirsizlik derecesi tam olarak 
hesaplanamamaktadır. Tehlike haritalarının oluşturulması, kırılganlık 
fonksiyonlarının üretilmesi, envanterin tanımlanması ve topolojik modelin 
oluşturulması sırasında çeşitli parametreler belirsizliğe etki etmektedir. 
Gerçekleştirilen bir duyarlılık analizi yardımıyla bu parametrelerdeki değişikliklerin 
analiz sonuçlarına etkileri irdelenmiştir. Analiz sonuçlarının doğruluğu ve 
güvenilirliğinin test edilebilmesi için, analiz yöntemi üzerinde bir geçerleme 
çalışmasının yapılması gerekliliği doğmaktadır. Bu tarz bir çalışma, geçmiş 
depremlere ait, uygun yapıda altyapı şebeke hasar ve performans verilerinin yokluğu 
nedeniyle henüz gerçekleştirilememiştir. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The subject of seismic loss and performance assessment is often perceived as being 
focused on the building stock. Structural damage gathers greater attention in seismic 
studies than infrastructural damage given its more direct effects on human lives. 
However, lifeline utility systems possess equally high importance to the wellness and 
functionality of urban societies. There are numerous examples of undermined 
response and recovery efforts following major earthquakes due to the direct or 
indirect consequences of severe infrastructural damage. 
1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake caused serious damage on transportation structures 
like Cypress Street Viaduct and San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge; broken gas lines 
in the Marina District caused fire; power outage caused the residents to sit in the 
dark, network congestion prevented making telephone calls and more than 1,200 
leaks and breaks were repaired in the water distribution system (Schiff, 1999). 
Following the 1994 Northridge Earthquake, whole city of Los Angeles experienced a 
blackout. Within the epicentral region, there were approximately 1,400 leak and 
break repairs on the water system and about 151,000 outages in the natural gas 
system (Lund, 1996). 1999 Kocaeli and Düzce Earthquakes caused heavy damage on 
mainly power, transportation, and communication systems with major fire damage to 
Tüpraş Oil Refinery and infrastructure damage to approximately 60 km of the 
Ankara-Istanbul Highway. About 7% of the overall distribution transformers and 
25% of the underground distribution cables within the power distribution network 
were heavily damaged (Erdik, 2001). 
The most recent major earthquakes in early 2010 which struck Haiti and Chile also 
portray the vital importance of lifeline networks on survival and on response and 
recovery efforts. Almost complete destruction of essential services such as water and 
electric power were experienced in Haiti, in addition to blocked major transportation 
routes along the country. The lack of transportation, limited communication, 
damaged infrastructure, and loss of personnel severely undermined the response and 
recovery efforts. The fuel shortage also affected the response efforts via the lack of 
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generator power used in life-saving equipment. It is also noted that the extensive 
structural damage and the destruction of Haiti’s infrastructure systems was expected 
to set back Haiti’s development significantly (Taft-Morales and Margesson, 2010). 
The 2010 Maule, Chile earthquake caused complications in the communication and 
control systems of most electric power installations, substations, and generation 
plants, resulting in complicated operation and recovery (Araneda et al., 2010). The 
rehabilitation of damaged roads, airports, dams, canals, bridges, and water towers 
due to the earthquake is expected to cost $1.2 billion to the Chilean government. The 
earthquake caused extensive failures on critical lifeline networks with disruption of 
gas service in some regions during several weeks, and a blackout right after the 
earthquake affecting 93% of the country’s population. Instances of irreparable 
damage were sighted on pipeline networks. The power outage resulted in severe 
problems in the telecommunication and water systems. It is reported that, although 
parts of the water system was repaired earlier than electric power systems, water 
could not be pumped to regions on higher elevations due to the lack of electricity 
(Elnashai et al., 2010). Additionally, the effects of lifeline damage have also slowed 
Chile’s economic status in short term, risking the country’s recovery from the 
financial crisis (Beittel and Margesson, 2010). 
The incidents mentioned above all point how important serviceability of lifeline 
systems under post-seismic conditions is. They also show how different lifeline 
systems interact and are dependent on each other in complex ways under various 
circumstances. This behavioral complexity caused by the interactions between 
different infrastructure systems sets numerous challenges to researchers aiming to 
develop loss and performance assessment methodologies. 
Lifeline networks (water, transportation, power, gas, telecommunication and 
transportation networks) are crucial elements forming the backbone of any society as 
complex systems providing essential services. These essential services play vital 
roles in response and recovery efforts following disasters, especially earthquakes. 
Given the importance of lifeline systems to the society; reliable seismic assessment 
of those systems becomes crucial for better preparedness. Developing computer 
technology enabled researchers to physically model the network structure of lifeline 
systems to simulate the performance and estimate the possible impacts of disasters 
on the system and residents via flow and connectivity models (Hwang et al., 1998; 
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Shinozuka et al., 1992; Tanaka, 1996). Tanaka (1996) developed methodologies for 
evaluating the serviceability of water and power networks by simulating 
connectivity, water pressure and critical component failure models. Network models 
are used to assess the seismic performances of lifeline systems and to recommend 
rehabilitation measures (Shinozuka et al., 1999). Shinozuka et al. (2007) have also 
utilized computer simulations to analyze component based progressive failures 
within lifeline systems.  
Lifeline networks are not standalone systems. There are numerous complex 
interactions between that affect the performance of each individual network. 
Modeling of complex systems is a major challenge for the researchers because of the 
unpredictable outcomes of the complicated interactions. Complex adaptive systems 
(CAS) are used to harness this complexity of these interactions (Axelrod and Cohen, 
1999). Rinaldi et al. (2001) broadly defined the interdependency concept, types of 
interdependencies between the systems and pointed out the potential implementation 
of the CAS approaches for interdependent lifeline networks. Having a broad 
perspective, interdependent models are implemented in economics for the 
enhancement of the credit risk analysis on a network of firms, where traditional 
credit risk models became inadequate (Neu and Kühn, 2004). 
The emphasis on interdependency in system analyses improves the assessment and 
prediction of lifeline seismic performances. This point of view necessitates the 
inclusion of geographic information systems, information technologies, and remote 
sensing applications in research and development efforts (O'Rourke, 1994). 
Interdependency concept had caught the attention of lifelines earthquake engineering 
studies in the last decade with increasing automation in infrastructure systems 
resulting in more complex systemic behaviors and more severe perturbations than 
before (Heller, 2002). Rinaldi et al. (2001) defined interdependency as “A 
bidirectional relationship between two infrastructure systems through which the state 
of each infrastructure influences or is correlated to the state of the other”. A 
conceptual framework was also proposed in the same study for utilization in 
identification, definition, and modeling of critical infrastructure interdependencies. 
Another factor leading researchers to consider interdependency in their studies has 
been the continuously increasing computational capabilities with advancing 
technology. Increased computational resources allow the analyses of larger networks, 
4 
larger databases, and complex interactions between separate networks with more 
reliable methodologies instead of adopting reductionist approaches due to limited 
capabilities.  
Trying to understand lifelines as systems of multiple interacting networks led Robert 
(2004) to propose a method to investigate the cascading effects of the networks and 
potential consequences to other networks. Shinozuka et al. (2005) influenced by this 
consideration, developed an analysis procedure to evaluate the performance of power 
and water systems in pre and post-earthquake conditions. The Mid-America 
Earthquake Center, aiming to provide an open-source and extensible environment for 
researchers, developed MAEviz to implement and utilize the most recent 
methodologies in seismic impact assessment with the consequence-based risk 
management approach. The “Interdependent Network Analysis” tool provided in 
MAEviz is based on the model proposed by Duenas-Osorio (2005) and the 
methodology developed by Kim (2007). The model is composed of topological 
network systems with multiple levels of interdependency. Duenas-Osorio (2005) 
defined three performance measures to quantify system functionality in his model: 
efficiency, connectivity loss, and service flow reduction. Network efficiency is 
interested in the physical distances between supply and demand nodes in topological 
networks and quantifies the ease of flow between these nodes. Connectivity loss is 
related with the existence of connecting paths between supply and demand nodes and 
quantifies the decrease in the number of supply nodes having connecting paths to 
demand nodes. Finally, service flow reduction is the measure addressing the impact 
on the end users via quantification of the amount of flow that does not meet the 
demand following an earthquake. Based on the same structural network model, Kim 
(2007) developed the “Interdependent Network Analysis” methodology with 
modified failure models, improved interdependent failure mechanisms, and further 
clarification on the probabilistic dependency model. 
1.1 Research Objectives 
This study takes on the research and development efforts of Kim (2007), aiming to 
improve the interdependent network analysis methodology. Although Kim’s 
methodology achieves its objectives to address and resolve issues needing further 
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refinement and improvement in the interdependent analysis methodology, there 
exists further room for improvement on the subject: 
 The buried pipeline damage algorithm utilized in the methodology only takes 
damages induced by ground shaking (PGV) into account. However, ground 
failure and permanent deformations (PGD) as results of liquefaction, fault 
rupture, or ground settlement also cause significant damage to buried 
pipelines in addition to ground shaking. There exist methodologies for 
estimation of combine pipeline damage against PGV and PGV in the 
literature, finding applications in loss estimation tools such as HAZUS. One 
of the main foci of this study is to implement a buried pipeline loss estimation 
methodology into the interdependent network analysis that would provide 
combined damage estimates and assess the effect of liquefaction-induced 
pipeline damage on network performance. 
 One of the issues that Kim (2007) turned his attention was the claim which 
stated interdependent failure mechanisms needed to be improved to more 
accurately reflect the physical situation. Within this context, the case of 
existence of backup power generators was added into the probabilistic 
interdependent failure model. However, the existing methodology adopts a 
system-based approach where the dependency mechanism homogeneously 
dictates the same behavior in every component throughout analyzed 
networks. For more accurate representation of the physical situation, an 
element-based approach was adopted in the dependency model where each 
component in the network is allowed to behave differently and have different 
dependency levels to account for possible localized mechanisms which may 
arise in lifeline networks. 
The improved methodology will then be applied in a case study which involves the 
seismic damage and lifeline utility networks serviceability analyses of the major 
urban areas located in the Central United States. The tasks include determination of 
scenario earthquakes, seismic damage assessment, topological modeling of lifeline 
networks, identification of dependencies, and interdependent serviceability analyses 
of the modeled networks. The Central United States analyses will also provide a 
convenient medium for the comparison of the two interdependent network 
performance analysis methodologies. 
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1.2 Thesis Organization 
Contents covered in the chapters of this dissertation are as follows: 
Chapter 2 features a literature review on the background of seismic loss and 
performance assessment studies such as lifelines earthquake engineering, GIS-based 
loss assessment, lifeline interdependencies, and interdependent network performance 
assessment. 
The general framework of the methodology is set and explained in Chapter 3. The 
methodology chapter is separated into two main sections as structural and topological 
models. Structural model definition is started first with the presentation of methods 
utilized for hazard estimation. In this section, estimation of both ground shaking and 
ground deformation hazards are covered. Hazard estimation is followed by inventory 
definitions where the component classification of the lifelines inventory is explained. 
Finally, fragility and damage formulations for the inventory elements subjected to 
seismic hazards are given as part of the structural model. The following section 
begins with the definition of the required data structure for topological modeling of 
networks. Data structure is followed with the explanation of the interdependency 
mechanism implemented in the model, including its formulations. The chapter closes 
with the presentation of network performance measures that are utilized to assess the 
serviceability of the modeled topological networks. 
Implementation of the methodology into computer environment is the focus point of 
Chapter 5. The analysis software (MAEviz) which is used in the analyses and the 
analysis tool provided by the software are explained to the reader in this chapter. File 
formats and the data structures of files required for analyses, and brief information 
on the utilized analysis algorithms in MAEviz are presented in detail. Documentation 
of changes and modifications in the methodology and its evaluation via comparison 
of results from both versions is also covered in this chapter. 
Chapter 6 documents the first of the case studies of the research. The analyses cover 
the seismic damage and interdependent network performance assessments of electric 
power, natural gas, and potable water networks of Shelby County, Tennessee. Based 
on the presented results, the effect of liquefaction-induced pipeline damage on the 
network performance measures is also discussed.  
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In the second case study, which is documented in Chapter 7, seismic damage and 
interdependent network performance assessment of potable water and electric power 
networks of St. Louis, Missouri is carried out. 
Chapter 8 discusses the uncertainty sources within the methodology. Hazard, 
fragility, inventory, and topological model components are examined separately and 
a sensitivity analysis is carried out the influence of selected input parameters to the 
resulting system performance values. 
The last chapter is assigned to the discussion of results obtained from the study. 
Comments based on the outcomes are presented and the significance of the 
achievements is evaluated in this chapter. The dissertation closes with concluding 
remarks regarding the research study and recommendations for possible future work 
in the subject. 
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2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A literature review is provided around three main themes for the study: Lifelines 
earthquake engineering, infrastructure interdependency and seismic loss assessment 
studies conducted in Turkey. The first section mainly summarizes the literature on 
loss and damage algorithms on buried pipelines and seismic performance modeling 
of lifeline utility networks. Infrastructural interdependencies are covered in the 
second section within a logical framework starting from conceptual studies, 
continuing on to observational and analytical model studies. The place of the current 
study within the wide research area of infrastructure interdependencies is also 
specified in this section. Finally, the chapter ends with a brief history of significant 
seismic awareness and loss assessment studies in Turkish academia. 
2.1 Lifelines Earthquake Engineering 
There have been numerous efforts to understand the effects of seismic wave 
propagation on buried pipeline damage (O'Rourke and Ayala, 1993; O'Rourke et al., 
1980; Pineda-Porras and Ordaz, 2007) to develop failure models and fragility 
relations. While some researchers have focused on observed damage caused by a 
specific earthquake (Chen et al., 2002; Erdik, 2001; Hwang et al., 2004; Isenberg et 
al., 1991; Jeon and O’Rourke, 2005; Lund, 1996; Takada et al, 2002), there has also 
been studies taking multiple earthquake records into account in order to develop 
fragility relations for buried pipelines in terms of repair rates for seismic assessment. 
Pipe damage can be estimated as functions of Modified Mercalli Intensity (Eguchi, 
1983; 1991), peak ground velocity (Barenberg, 1988; Eidinger, 2001; O'Rourke and 
Ayala, 1993; O'Rourke and Jeon, 1999; Trifunac and Todorovska, 1997) or 
permanent ground deformation (Eidinger, 2001). 
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Barenberg (1988) proposed the existence of a correlation between pipeline damage 
and a ground deformation parameter using a strong ground motion database from 
past earthquakes. Buried pipeline damage in regions of low to moderate intensity 
shaking was accounted to transient ground deformations (TGD) such as velocity 
induced ground strain. Additionally, in regions with relatively high permanent 
ground deformations (PGD), pipeline damage was more significantly attributed to 
PGD inducing agents like surface rupture, liquefaction, or ground settlement. 
Ballantyne et al. (1990) rated various pipe types for their seismic capacities 
considering ruggedness, bending, joint flexibility and restraint to develop a bilinear 
pipeline damage algorithm for the modeling and analyses of the Seattle water system 
(Table 2.1). The resulting rankings provide valuable information on relative seismic 
capacities of pipeline materials. O'Rourke and Ayala (1993) expanded the database 
of Barenberg (1988) with new data records from U.S. and Mexican earthquakes. The 
improved database also included various different pipe materials like asbestos 
cement, concrete, and pre-stressed concrete. Developed damage functions were 
adopted by FEMA for implementation into HAZUS. 
Table 2.1 : Relative seismic capacities of buried pipes (Ballantyne et al., 1990). 
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Polyethylene Fusion 4 5 5 5 19 
Steel Arc Welded 5 5 4 5 19 
Steel Riveted 5 5 4 4 18 
Steel B&S, RG, R 5 5 4 4 18 
Ductile Iron B&S, RG, R 5 5 4 4 18 
Steel B&S, RG, UR 5 5 4 1 15 
Ductile Iron B&S, RG, UR 5 5 4 1 15 
Concrete w. Steel Cylinder B&S, R 3 4 4 3 14 
PVC B&S, R 3 3 4 3 13 
Concrete w. Steel Cylinder B&S, UR 3 4 4 1 12 
Asbestos Cement > 8" diameter Coupled 2 4 5 1 12 
Cast Iron > 8" diameter B&S, RG 2 4 4 1 11 
PVC B&S, UR 3 3 4 1 11 
Steel Gas Welded 3 3 1 2 9 
Asbestos Cement ≤ 8" diameter Coupled 2 1 5 1 9 
Cast Iron ≤ 8" diameter B&S, RG 2 1 4 1 8 
Cast Iron B&S, Rigid 2 2 1 1 6 
B&S: Bell and spigot; RG: Rubber gasket; R: Restrained; UR: Unrestrained 
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With the utilization of comprehensive GIS analysis tools and collection of extensive 
information from the 1994 Northridge Earthquake, Toprak et al. (1999) developed 
new damage functions for brittle and ductile pipes using the improved pipeline 
damage database, containing mainly cast iron pipes. Separate functions for ductile 
iron, cast iron, asbestos cement, and steel pipelines were developed by O'Rourke and 
Jeon (1999). The damage functions used pipe diameter as an additional parameter 
which was used for scaling PGV. 
Analyzing data records from U.S., Japan, and Mexico earthquakes, newer PGV 
damage functions were introduced by the American Lifelines Alliance (Eidinger, 
2001). 81 data points from a total of 12 earthquakes contained information for cast 
iron, steel, asbestos cement, ductile iron, and concrete pipes. The proposed backbone 
function by Eidinger (2001) was suggested to be used in the lack of knowledge on 
parameters like pipe material, joint type, diameter, and corrosion. When the 
mentioned parameters are known, the backbone equation needs to be multiplied by a 
coefficient determined according to the parameters. 
O'Rourke and Deyoe (2004) pointed out a significant difference between O'Rourke 
and Ayala (1993) function and the remaining damage functions developed after the 
1994 Northridge earthquake. The study proposed that different surface wave types 
were dominant in different data sets. The study proposed two different functions for 
cases where R waves and S waves were dominant, respectively. O'Rourke and Deyoe 
(2004) suggested that R waves would be dominant on the data record when the 
epicentral distance to focal depth ratio was 5 or higher. S waves were accepted to be 
dominant otherwise. A comparative plot of the existing buried pipeline damage 
functions is provided in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 : A comparison of buried pipeline damage functions. 
Lifeline vulnerability assessment of pipelines based on direct damage has been 
utilized since the formation of vulnerability models for underground pipeline systems 
(Eguchi, 1983). Following were the efforts to determine vulnerabilities of the lifeline 
systems prone to earthquake damage (Heubach, 1995; Torres-Vera and Canas, 2003; 
Yamazaki et al., 1998). Use of geographic information systems (GIS) enabled 
researchers to carry on more detailed vulnerability analyses and to utilize retrofit 
analysis and prioritization based on damage (Wijewickreme et al., 2005). Hwang et 
al. (1998) again utilized GIS to carry out connectivity and flow analysis of a system 
according to the pipe damage. Likely so, O'Rourke et al. (1999) took advantage of 
geographic information technologies to characterize the effects of the 1994 
Northridge Earthquake on Los Angeles water and power systems. Loss assessment 
software like HAZUS and MAEviz accomodate built in GIS environment providing 
essential spatial analysis capabilities to its users. Kircher et al. (2006) and Steelman 
et al. (2007) have provided technical information and the methodologies of the 
analyses offered by HAZUS and MAEviz, respectively. 
The concept of performance analysis has a broader perspective compared to 
vulnerability analysis. The system performance is assessed by considering the effects 
of the estimated damage to the network. American Lifelines Alliance (ALA, 2005a; 
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2005b) has published guidelines for seismic performance and reliability analyses of 
lifeline networks. 
Developing computer technology also enabled researchers to physically model the 
network structure of lifeline systems to simulate the performance and estimate the 
possible impacts of disasters on the system and residents via flow and connectivity 
models (Hwang et al., 1998; Shinozuka et al., 1992; Tanaka, 1996). Tanaka (1996) 
developed methodologies for evaluating the serviceability of water and power 
networks by simulating connectivity, water pressure and critical component failure 
models. Network models are used to assess the seismic performances of lifeline 
systems and to recommend rehabilitation measures (Shinozuka et al., 1999). Cagnan 
et al. (2006) developed a simulation based methodology to model post-earthquake 
restoration process of electric power systems and to determine direct and indirect 
economic losses. The methodology consisted of damage estimation, restoration, and 
direct-indirect loss estimation models. A Monte-Carlo framework was utilized 
comprising of consecutive simulations to estimate outage patterns via an initial 
damage model, updated damage patterns via a flow and connectivity-based 
restoration model, direct economic damage via an economic loss model, and indirect 
economic losses based on average outage and direct economic loss data. Shinozuka 
et al. (2007) have also utilized computer simulations to analyze component based 
progressive failures within lifeline systems. Trying to understand lifelines as systems 
of multiple interacting networks led Robert (2004) to propose a method to investigate 
the cascading effects of the networks and potential consequences to other networks. 
Shinozuka et al. (2005) influenced by this consideration, developed an analysis 
procedure to evaluate the performance of power and water systems in pre and post-
earthquake conditions. 
2.2 Network Interdependency 
The term interdependency is defined as: “A bidirectional relationship between two 
infrastructures through which the state of each infrastructure influences or is 
correlated to the state of the other” by Rinaldi et al. (2001). Modeling the lifelines as 
a system of networks with proper dependency considerations instead of treating them 
as independent networks is one approach towards more accurate anticipation of the 
effects of earthquakes (Kim, 2007). A system of systems approach requires modeling 
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multiple but individually operational networks that would interact with each other to 
satisfy specific demands (Satumtira and Duenas-Osorio, 2010). 
Interdependencies among lifeline networks can be described via numerous 
occurrences. Lifeline networks of San Francisco experienced extensive damage due 
to the Loma Prieta Earthquake in 1989. Water supply system on the lower zones of 
the city had failed because of damaged pipes and hydrants. A system wide disruption 
had been witnessed on the water network due to cascading failures, which lead to the 
loss of firefighting abilities.  Also, an exploding gas transmission line in New York 
in 1989 that caused power loss for about 5 hours can be given as another example of 
lifeline interdependency (O'Rourke, 1994). Infrastructure interdependencies can be 
defined as failures within a system due to an initial infrastructural failure on a 
different system caused by an extreme event (McDaniels et al., 2008). Modeling of 
network interdependencies is a highly complex task, given the different nature of 
each physical or spatial connection between systems. Depending on the extent of the 
study, several disciplines such as civil engineering, mechanical engineering, 
electrical engineering, computer science, economics and other social sciences may 
have to get involved. Failure to identify the complex behavior of interacting systems 
and the underlying dynamics of the complex structure of interdependent systems 
(Figure 2.2) would result in inadequate response and poor performance in the 
prepared plans which may cause loss of public trust and human life (Pederson et al., 
2006). 
Heller (2002) stated the complexity of system behaviors with increasing automation 
in the infrastructure systems and pointed out the possibility that system 
interdependencies may cause global perturbations more severe than previously 
expected. Integration of information systems in infrastructure operations targets the 
achievement of new technologies, overcoming limitations, and increasing operational 
efficiency. Focus on infrastructure interdependencies was initiated following the 
Presidential Decision Directive Number 63 (Clinton, 1998) which revealed the 
rapidly growing exploitation potential of energy, banking, finance, transportation, 
lifelines, and telecommunications systems. Incapacity or destruction of these systems 
were said to cause severe impacts on United States’ defense and economic security. 
Heller (2002) also described infrastructure systems as complex adaptive systems 
(CAS) where the systemic behavior is influenced by patterns resulting from dynamic, 
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nonlinear, and spatiotemporal interactions among sub-systems or components. 
Modeling of complex systems is a major challenge for the researchers because of the 
unpredictable outcomes of the complicated interactions. Complex adaptive systems 
are used to harness this complexity of these interactions (Axelrod and Cohen, 1999). 
 
Figure 2.2 : Infrastructure interdepenedencies (Pederson et al., 2006). 
Rinaldi et al. (2001) presented a conceptual framework for identification, definition, 
and modeling of critical infrastructure interdependencies. According to the 
framework, there exist six dimensions of infrastructure interdependencies intending 
to define, understand, and model the interdependencies. The six dimensions of 
infrastructure interdependencies are: type of interdependency, coupling and response 
behavior, failure type, infrastructure characteristics, and state of operations (Figure 
2.3). 
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Figure 2.3 : Dimensions of infrastructure interdependencies (Rinaldi et al., 2001). 
System interactions may vary depending on the interdependency type where physical 
interdependency suggests the state of each infrastructure is influenced by the material 
output of another; cyber interdependency suggests the state of an infrastructure is 
influenced by the information transmitted through the information system; 
geographic interdependency suggests a local event altering the states of the 
infrastructure systems in proximity such as an explosion causing correlated 
disturbances; and logical interdependency suggests the state of an infrastructure 
system is dependent of the state of another via a non-physical, non-geographical, and 
non-cyber connection (Rinaldi et al., 2001). 
Analyzing infrastructure systems with a system-of-systems perspective with 
interdependency considerations would lead to enhanced validity of analyses and 
better, more appropriate policies and decision regarding emergencies with severe 
disruptions on infrastructure systems. However, each existing modeling and 
simulation methodology addresses one or more factors associated with 
interdependencies that complicate analysis efforts (Table 2.2). It is suggested that 
multidisciplinary approaches may result in the development of an all-encompassing 
methodology (Rinaldi, 2004). 
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Table 2.2 : Factors affecting interdependency analyses (Rinaldi, 2004). 
Factor Implication for Analyses 
Time Scales 
Different infrastructures have varying time scales of 
importance, varying from milliseconds to years. 
Geographic Scales 
Issues range from cities to national or international levels 
in scale. Scale affects the resolution and quantity of 
infrastructure and interdependency data required for 
models. 
Cascading Effects 
Disruptions in one infrastructure can ripple or cascade 
into other infrastructures, creating second and higher 
order disruptions. 
Social/Psychological 
Elements 
Social networks and behavioral responses can influence 
infrastructure operations, such as the spread of an 
infectious disease and the response of the public health 
infrastructure. 
Operational 
Procedures 
Company-specific procedures influence the state of an 
infrastructure, such as responses to market fluctuations. 
Business Policies 
Specific corporate business policies affect the operations 
of the infrastructures. 
Restoration and  
Recovery Procedures 
Company-specific procedures influence the state of an 
infrastructure during a crisis or emergency, and may 
affect coordination among various infrastructure owners. 
Cross-infrastructure restoration/recovery procedures may 
not exist. 
Legal and 
Regulatory Regimes 
Government actions will influence operational behaviors 
as well as the response to and recovery from disasters or 
disruptions. 
Stakeholder 
Concerns 
Stakeholders have differing motivations and different sets 
of concerns that drive modeling and simulation 
requirements. 
Given the complex behavior of interdependent systems, modeling and simulation 
efforts would provide approximate information on the consequences of rare extreme 
events, however would not be accurately representing them. Although the 
stakeholders of infrastructure systems have extensive experience regarding daily 
small-scale outages and disruptions, the limited experience against major 
infrastructure failures requires the utilization such modeling and simulation efforts 
which would provide valuable insight for development of mitigation, response and 
recovery plans. With the inadequacy of historical record and experience, simulation 
of interdependent system models offer the only guidance available (Rinaldi, 2004). 
Additionally, verification and validation of the existing models possess great 
importance for the development and improvement of existing methodologies. This 
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can be achieved by taking historical information or commonly acknowledged models 
as benchmarks for testing and calibrating new models. 
In the presence of numerous uncertainties within the available models, it is necessary 
to obtain essential data for inventory validation in order to result in assessments as 
accurate as possible. Acquisition, updating, verification, and validation of data have 
fundamental importance in modeling and present one of the biggest obstacles in the 
process according to Rinaldi (2000). Since most infrastructure systems are owned 
and operated by private entities, crucial information for the development are not 
easily and directly accessible. Most data owners abstain from sharing information 
due to concerns about possible confidentiality, privacy, liability, security, and legal 
issues that may be faced. 
Interdependency concept was first realized and investigated in economic and social 
models. Haavelmo (1943) stated the improbability to utilize a suitable method for 
statistical assessment of an economic relation without taking the set of relationships 
with the theoretical model which it is originating from into account. Such models 
which are characterized by mutual interactions between the variables are defined as 
interdependent models. Interdependency theory was developed by Thibaut and 
Kelley (1959) for social models with the aim to clarify the life-space representation 
of human motivation where all interdependencies were defined via four parameters: 
degree of dependency, mutuality of dependency, correspondence of outcomes, and 
the basis for dependency. Wilson and Pownall (1976) emphasized the aggregation 
difficulties of interacting systems via urban models. They proposed a micro-level 
interdependency model which would overcome the problems caused by the weak 
connections between the subsystems within an urban system. Boissevain (1979) 
pointed out the significance of interdependency by stating that interdependencies 
would provide a framework where separation of micro and macro analytical levels 
from each other was difficult. The focus on interdependency in network analysis also 
enables modeling of secondary agents resulting from the interactions. Gee and 
Treuner (1981) published one of the earliest works focusing on infrastructure 
interdependency by proposing a regional development planning model for a system 
of interdependent networks. Victor and Blackburn (1987) used the interdependence 
theory by Thibaut and Kelley to investigate inter-unit conflict and the outcomes of 
coordination strategy in business models. Business models implementing multiple 
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criteria decision making analysis used to make the initial assumption of independent 
criteria. Carlsson and Fullér (1995) developed a systematic procedure to determine 
and analyze the interdependencies for the solutions of multi-criteria decision making 
problems. 
Although interdependent models are widely applied in business and economics, 
considering the complex interacting structures of lifeline systems and computational 
capabilities, there also exists application opportunities in lifeline earthquake 
engineering studies. Interdependent models were utilized for estimation of economic 
impacts on regional systems of agriculture, mining, construction, etc. following a 
major disruption on power distribution systems caused by catastrophic earthquakes 
(Rose et al., 1997). The ASPEN-EE tool, developed by Barton et al. (2000) provides 
an agent-based model to assess possible power outages and their impacts on market 
structures performing decision-making processes via agent interactions. The 
interactions were modeled between household, commercial, industrial, governmental, 
generation company, system operator, fuel company, disaster, bulletin board, and 
weather agents. 
Within the context of earthquake engineering, network interactions and 
interdependencies are taken into consideration to determine the system performance 
after a perturbation (Adachi and Ellingwood, 2008) or to consider the effects of 
restoration efforts to the network performance (Lee II et al., 2007; Shinozuka et al., 
2005).  
Duenas-Osorio (2005) developed a model composed of network systems with 
multiple levels of interdependencies based on spatial proximity. Instead of a macro-
level approach to the interacting systems, the model focused on network topology 
(physical layout) and flow patterns. In this model, topology of a network is 
characterized by a number of parameters: Mean Distance (L) – measure of the 
shortest paths between each vertice pair; Vertex Degree (d(v)) – the number of edges 
at vertex v; Clustering Coefficient (γ) – characterizing the extent to which vertices 
adjacent to a vertex v are adjacent to each other; and Redundancy Ratio (RR) - a 
measure of the number of different paths from a vertex to each of the vertices within 
the set of the neighbors of its neighbors. Duenas-Osorio (2005) also defined three 
performance measures for functionality characterization of a network: Efficiency, 
connectivity loss and service flow reduction. These measures assess the network 
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performance with metrics depending on the topological settings of the network, or 
with more detailed metrics depending on supply, demand, and flow patterns 
additional to the topological settings. Connectivity Loss (CL) measures the ability of 
every distribution node to receive flow from generation nodes. Service Flow 
Reduction (SFR) determines the amount of flow that the system can provide based on 
the demand before the disturbance. 
Kim (2007) has proposed a methodology based on the network structure defined by  
Duenas-Osorio (2005) with further clarification on the probabilistic interdependency 
model, modified failure models and improved interdependent failure mechanisms. 
The model is formulated over electric power and water network systems with water 
system being dependent on electric power, based on the fact that electricity is vital 
for the operation of almost every function in urban societies (Shinozuka et al., 2005). 
CL and SFR measures were utilized for the interacting networks in order to quantify 
the functional loss of a system when some of the components are likely to be 
dysfunctional.  Each network is built of links and nodes; with links representing 
power lines or water pipes, nodes representing network facility structures. Nodes are 
classified as generation, intermediate, or distribution in each network where flow in 
the network is generated by generation nodes, and is discharged by distribution 
nodes. The interactions were defined between the networks where water generation 
nodes are dependent to electric power supplied to the system by power distribution 
nodes. The failure of a component after an earthquake is linked to two main reasons 
in the model: Failure due to earthquake damage, and non-functionality of a network 
component due to power outage. Power outage can be caused by earthquake damage 
to the distribution facility, or failure of the nodes and links in the power network 
feeding electric power to the distribution node. Furthermore, although being 
functional and not affected by interdependency, a network node can still fail by 
losing its connectivity to the network. This happens when a generation node has no 
surviving outgoing links, or when a distribution node has no surviving incoming 
links, thus being isolated from the network (Kim, 2007). The effects of network 
interconnection on post-seismic serviceability are presented in Figure 2.4 and Figure 
2.5. 
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Figure 2.4 : Effect of interdependency on connectivity loss (Kim, 2007). 
 
Figure 2.5 : Effect of interdependency on service flow reduction (Kim, 2007). 
22 
Satumtira and Duenas-Osorio (2010) classified interdependent modeling based on 
existing literature in a hierarchial manner under six main categories: mathematical 
model, modeling objective, analysis scale, quantity and quality of input data, targeted 
discipline, and end-user type (Figure 2.6). It was stressed out that most of the 
existing interdependent modeling strategies were complimentary to each other rather 
than competing and hybrid modeling techniques that would be the combination of 
multiple approaches would be beneficial for the future of lifelines interdependency 
modeling. The study also specify that while early models developed for lifelines 
interdependency were taking agent-based approaches for simulation of specialized 
and diverse tasks within lifeline systems, most recent models are mostly probabilistic 
models based on graph and network theories. Probabilistic network models provide 
more accurate visual representation of the physical structure of lifeline systems with 
a less data-intensive approach than agent-based models. Utilization of network and 
graph theories enables modeling of various types of infrastructure components and 
their coupling topology with accurate visual representation. In such models, 
interdependencies are defined with adjacency matrices specifying the agents, 
direction, and the strength of couplings via conditional probabilities (Satumtira and 
Duenas-Osorio, 2010). 
According to the hierarchical classification of interdependent models, the 
methodology that is utilized in this study can be specified as adopting a network 
model based on graph theory as its mathematical model; with topological structuring 
of the analyzed networks and utilizing interdependency tables to define the 
interactions between network agents. The objective of the model is to aid risk and 
vulnerability assessment studies by providing estimations on seismic loss and system 
serviceability on a system of systems scale. The input data for the analyses is 
required to be gathered from the data owning infrastructural service providers 
through mutual agreements. The main target discipline of the methodology is 
engineering. However since the analysis output may be used to assess the affected 
population, it is possible to utilize the analysis methodology on social models. 
Finally, the end users to benefit from the analyses would be academic researchers 
who want to develop more accurate and improved models or governmental agencies 
who would use the assessment results on disaster management planning efforts. 
23 
 
Figure 2.6 : Hierarchial classification of interdependent models (Satumtira and 
Duenas-Osorio, 2010). 
2.3 Earthquake Loss Assessment Studies In Turkey 
“One of the first efforts for an earthquake oriented disaster management studies in 
Istanbul is the project conducted by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 
contracted by Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IMM). The objectives of the study 
were stated in the final report as to compile seismic microzoning maps which would 
form a basis for future preparedness and mitigation studies for Istanbul, to develop 
structural code recommendations for earthquake-resilient urbanization, and to advise 
on effective planning (JICA, 2002). Analysis outcomes suggested that southwestern 
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parts of Istanbul would experience the most severe earthquake damage based on 
determined worst case earthquake scenario” (Ünen et al., 2010). JICA study defined 
four probable earthquake scenarios that would affect Istanbul with moment 
magnitudes varying between 6.9 and 7.7. A consortium of major universities of 
Turkey developed an earthquake master plan for Istanbul under contract for IMM 
(IMM, 2003). The study used an earthquake scenario (Mw = 7.5) which was stated as 
the most probable earthquake scenario for Istanbul in the JICA study (Figure 2.7). 
 
Figure 2.7 : The most probable scenario for Istanbul (JICA, 2002). 
Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake Research Institute (KOERI) of Boğaziçi 
University have conducted a study in 2003 to develop a risk model for the Istanbul 
metropolitan region based on the earthquake scenarios presented in the JICA study 
using the KOERILOSS tool (KOERI, 2003). Scope of the study was to estimate 
building and infrastructure damage and casualties. Structural damage, similar to 
JICA study, was estimated cumulatively for the building and infrastructural stock 
contained in 500 x 500 meter cells forming a grid along the metropolitan area. Total 
economic loss was estimated to be approximately 11 billion USD according to the 
analyses. 
Yakut et al. (2006) proposed a methodology for the seismic performance assessment 
of low-to-mid-rise reinforced concrete buildings in Turkey with displacement-based 
damage indexes. The scenario earthquake with Mw=7.5 was selected for the analyses 
3036 buildings between one and seven storeys. 
In 2007, development of a loss estimation tool that can realize all possible 
earthquake scenarios for a region of interest and provide the result of the effects and 
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offer reinforcements to mitigate the consequences of a disaster was achieved as a 
result of a joint study between Istanbul Technical University (ITU) and the MAE 
Center. The resulting product, HAZTURK, was a multipurpose risk assessment tool 
which comprehensively addressed all aspects of risk management by supporting the 
integration of physical, social, and economic consequences of earthquakes with 
decision and public policy making (Karaman, 2008). HAZTURK is a tool utilizing a 
consequence-based risk management (CRM) approach developed by the MAE 
Center. The study represents the estimations for the damage on the structures with 
respect to the most probable and the worst case earthquake scenarios suggested in the 
JICA study and estimated by the HAZTURK software, which is a modified version 
of the MAEviz for Turkey (Karaman et al., 2008). The objective of the HAZTURK 
system was to provide a reliable loss estimation analysis that can be used by a region 
or municipality for earthquake hazard preparation and mitigation. HAZTURK 
(MAEviz-Istanbul) software was employed to visualize the earthquake risk and its 
possible damage to structures and people, considering all the aspects of a seismic risk 
assessment process and to offer options for decision makers all in one tool (Elnashai 
et al., 2008). 
Minimal attention was paid to the importance of lifeline systems in Turkey before the 
1999 Kocaeli and Düzce earthquakes. According to the report on 1999 Kocaeli and 
Düzce Earthquakes compiled by Erdik (2000), the earthquakes caused damage to 
structures in Kocaeli, Sakarya, Düzce, Yalova, Bolu, Istanbul, Bursa, Eskişehir, and 
Bilecik. The earthquakes mainly affected power, transport, and communication 
systems in the epicentral regions. Damaged substations of the power transmission 
systems in Kocaeli and Sakarya caused blackouts in northwestern Turkey within 
minutes following the earthquake and power had not been restored for several days. 
Approximately 7% of distribution transformers in the affected urban regions were 
heavily damaged and 30% of underground distribution lines and 6% of the towers 
were also damaged. Water systems in Gölcük (Southern Kocaeli) and Sakarya 
experienced heavy damage and the water supply was cut off for a long duration due 
to extensive pipe breaks caused by the fault rupture and liquefaction. Izmit water 
system, on the other hand, experienced minor damage mainly because of the modern 
steel transmission lines and plants of the city. Although Kocaeli is the junction for 
the majority of international petroleum and natural gas transmission and major 
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distribution pipelines passing through Turkey; no damage was reported on the major 
pipeline systems. Also, no severe damage was reported on the city gas distribution 
network; but on service boxes due to collapsed buildings (Erdik, 2000). 
 
Figure 2.8 : Damage to water and natural gas pipelines of Istanbul (JICA, 2002). 
Some earthquake loss assessment studies conducted for Istanbul also focused on 
damage to lifeline systems along with building damage. As part of the JICA (2002) 
study, Loss assessment was performed for damage to potable water pipelines, 
wastewater pipelines, natural gas pipelines, natural gas service boxes, electric power 
lines, and fiber-optic telecommunication lines (Figure 2.8). Damage assessment to 
network facility structures were excluded from the study. Analysis outcomes 
suggested that southwestern parts of Istanbul would experience the most severe 
earthquake damage based on determined worst case earthquake scenario. 
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Karaman (2008), in his study of development a loss estimation tool to analyze the 
effects of possible earthquake scenarios to Turkey, carried out pipeline damage 
analyses on the buried pipeline inventory of the Zeytinburnu district of Istanbul 
(Figure 2.9). 
 
Figure 2.9 : Damage to Zeytinburnu natural gas pipelines (Karaman, 2008). 
Future possible applications of the current Ph.D study will feature the application of 
seismic damage and interdependent network performance analysis on topologically 
modeled electric power, potable water, and natural gas networks of Istanbul based on 
the expected Marmara earthquake scenarios. The methodologies applied in the study 
will provide an environment for the assessment of seismic performance of lifeline 
networks and local interactions between the networks in the region. Integration of the 
methodologies with the HAZTURK system would serve the continuing goal set by 
Karaman (2008) for updating potential risks and their consequences as the 
inventories and analysis methodologies evolve over time. The dynamic behavior of 
the system will enable the earthquake scenarios, analysis methodologies, loss 
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assessments, mitigation, response and recovery plans to be updated continuously 
when needed. 
29 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
Performance assessment of interdependent networks requires utilization of two 
separate models utilized consecutively: structural model for damage estimation, and 
the topological model for connectivity and flow analyses based on structural damage 
assessment output (Figure 3.1). The inventory datasets must be provided in 
compliance with the requirements of both models since the output of the structural 
assessment is used as an input in interdependent performance assessment. 
 
Figure 3.1 : Interdependent Network Performance Analysis flowchart. 
In the structural model, damage assessment of the inventory items are carried out 
based on specified hazard and fragility information. Each inventory item is assigned 
to corresponding fragility functions based on specific attributes. Fragility relations 
are used to estimate the expected damage based on the corresponding hazard type 
and value. The estimated damage is then used for failure assessment of network 
components in the succeeding steps of the analysis. Structural analysis gives the 
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structural earthquake damage to the network components due to ground shaking and 
liquefaction caused by the scenario earthquake. 
Topological model is where the networks are modeled based on connectivity and 
flow relations. Failures of components are determined based on structural damage 
and interdependency effects via carrying out numerical simulations. Re-structured 
networks with their surviving components are analyzed by applying Monte Carlo 
Simulations to determine the system performance based on reductions in 
connectivity and flow. System performance is the quantification of the effect of 
physical damage on the network flow and system serviceability. Topological analysis 
estimates the effects of earthquakes on the end-users by quantifying the amount of 
service loss for each individual network. 
3.1 Structural Model 
Structural modeling is the initial step in the performance assessment of 
interdependent lifeline networks. The essential elements for structural damage 
assessment are hazard, inventory, and fragility. Hazard is taken as the descriptive 
parameter quantifying the possible earthquake ground motions within a region of 
interest. The assets in a region exposed to hazards are defined by inventory. Finally, 
fragility is the sensitivity of certain types of inventory items subjected to hazard. All 
three elements are vitally important for the achievement of accurate assessments. 
Thus, accurate definitions and utilizations of inventory, hazard, and vulnerability 
parameters are equally important (Betbeder-Matibet, 2008).  
Hazard and vulnerability are the agents that define the seismic risk. Reduction of risk 
can be achieved by reduction of vulnerabilities through modifications and 
improvements in the inventory. Vulnerability of a man-made environment is almost 
entirely dependent on the human factor, whereas hazard is a natural phenomenon and 
cannot be reduced nor prevented (Elnashai and Di Sarno, 2008). 
3.1.1 Hazard 
Seismic hazard is the quantification of ground motions without any reference to 
human or structural loss, simply depending on the characteristics of the selected 
scenario earthquake. Main parameters on hazard estimation are the earthquake 
magnitude, distance, and site conditions. Based on its definition, seismic hazard 
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differs from seismic risk, which is mainly dependent on the impact of one earthquake 
on societies or the structural inventory. 
Earthquake hazard can be classified into two types as transient ground deformations 
(ground shaking) and permanent ground deformations induced by liquefaction, 
ground settlement, landslides, or surface rupture.  
Quantification of ground shaking is obtained by ground acceleration (PGA, Sa) or 
ground velocity (PGV) parameters. They can be measured by monitoring stations, 
generated by computers using synthetic processes in the absence of recordings, or 
calculated via attenuation equations. Peak ground acceleration (PGA) can be 
described as the maximum acceleration experienced by a particle on the ground 
during an earthquake. It is not a measure of earthquake intensity, but a shaking 
intensity at a given location. PGA is directly extracted from the strong motion record 
as the maximum amplitude. Peak ground velocity, on the other hand, is the 
maximum velocity experienced by a particle on the ground during an earthquake. 
3.1.1.1 Estimation of ground shaking 
Ground shaking is estimated by utilizing attenuation relations developed via 
regression analyses using existing ground motion records with various soil types, 
body wave type, source mechanism, etc. Attenuation relations may also be developed 
theoretically using generated synthetic ground motion data in absence or 
insufficiency of observational data (Elnashai and Di Sarno, 2008). 
Main parameters of attenuation relations are earthquake magnitude, fault/rupture 
type, distance, and site conditions. Next generation attenuation relations developed 
recently also use detailed rupture directivity characteristics as input parameters. 
Majority of the modern attenuation relations use the moment magnitude (Mw) as the 
earthquake magnitude parameter. Moment magnitude accounts for the shear 
mechanism taking place at rupture zones and is not related to wave amplitudes. It is a 
function of the extent of deformation at the earthquake source. Mw can be used to 
measure the whole spectrum of ground motions and it gives the most reliable 
estimate of earthquake size for very large earthquakes where the previous magnitude 
scales saturate and cannot measure (Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1 : Common earthquake magnitude scales (Elnashai and Di Sarno, 2008). 
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ML 
Richter  
(1935) 
Small Shallow 
< 375 
miles 
Regional 
(California) 
✓ 
Mb 
Gutenberg 
and Richter 
(1956) 
Small-to-
Medium 
Deep 
> 625 
miles 
Worldwide ✓ 
Ms 
Gutenberg 
and Richter 
(1936) 
Large Shallow 
> 1250 
miles 
Worldwide ✓ 
Mw 
Kanamori 
(1983) 
All All All Worldwide N.A. 
However, there exists no generally applied standard on the distance parameter (Bolt 
and Abrahamson, 2003). Different attenuation relations use different distance 
parameters. Table 3.2 defines and summarizes the most common distance parameters 
used in attenuation relations. 
Table 3.2 : Distance definitions used in attenuation relations (Lee et al., 2003). 
Distance Type Definition 
Joyner-Boore 
Distance 
Shortest horizontal distance to the surface projection 
of rupture 
Rupture Distance Distance to the plane of rupture 
Seismogenic 
Distance 
Closest distance to the seismogenic part of the 
rupture 
Hypocentral 
Distance 
Closest distance to hypocenter 
Centroid Distance Closest distance to the centroid of the rupture  
Tectonic regions, seismic sources, and geological conditions generally pose different 
attenuation characteristics. Following the increase in the number of available ground 
motion recordings for various regions, more regionally oriented attenuation relations 
have been developed instead of global average models covering much broader 
tectonic regions. Nevertheless, there still is not sufficient information to completely 
and accurately develop attenuation relations for any region (Bolt and Abrahamson, 
2003).  
33 
3.1.1.2 Estimation of ground shaking 
Permanent ground deformation (PGD) is associated with ground failure. There are 
three types of ground failure mechanisms: liquefaction, landslides, and surface fault 
rupture. The structural model considers liquefaction damage in impact assessment. 
Liquefaction is a soil behavior in which a saturated soil loses a substantial amount of 
strength due to high excess pore-water pressure generated by strong earthquake 
ground shaking. Susceptibility of a soil is determined utilizing a classification system 
based on geological characteristics (Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3 : Liquefaction susceptibility of soils (Youd and Perkins, 1987). 
Type of deposit 
General 
distribution of 
cohesionless 
sediments 
Liquefaction susceptibility of cohesionless sediments 
(by age of deposit) 
< 500 yr 
Modern 
Holocene 
< 11 ka 
Pleistocene 
11 ka - 2 
Ma 
Pre-
Pleistocene 
> 2 Ma 
Continental Deposits 
River channel Locally variable Very High High Low Very Low 
Flood plain Locally variable High Moderate Low Very Low 
Alluvial fan and 
plain 
Widespread Moderate Low Low Very Low 
Marine terraces 
and plains 
Widespread --- Low Very Low Very Low 
Delta and fan-
delta 
Widespread High Moderate Low Very Low 
Lacustrine and 
playa 
Variable High Moderate Low Very Low 
Colluvium Variable High Moderate Low Very Low 
Talus Widespread Low Low Very Low Very Low 
Dunes Widespread High Moderate Low Very Low 
Loess Variable High High High Unknown 
Glacial till Variable Low Low Very Low Very Low 
Tuff Rare Low Low Very Low Very Low 
Tephra Widespread High High ? ? 
Residual soils  Rare  Low  Low  Very Low  Very Low  
Sebka  Locally variable  High  Moderate  Low  Very Low  
Coastal Zones 
Delta  Widespread  Very High  High  Low  Very Low  
Esturine  Locally variable  High  Moderate  Low  Very Low  
Beach       
High Wave Energy  Widespread  Moderate  Low  Very Low  Very Low  
Low Wave Energy  Widespread  High  Moderate  Low  Very Low  
Lagoonal  Locally variable  High  Moderate  Low  Very Low  
Fore shore  Locally variable  High  Moderate  Low  Very Low  
Artificial 
Uncompacted Fill  Variable  Very High  ---  ---  ---  
Compacted Fill  Variable  Low  ---  ---  ---  
34 
The likelihood of liquefaction is generally influenced by the amplitude of ground 
shaking, the duration of ground shaking (represented in terms of moment 
magnitude), and the groundwater depth (FEMA, 2003). Probability of liquefaction 
for a given soil can be estimated using the following equation: 
 (            )  
 (            |     )
     
     (3.1) 
where  (            ) is the conditional liquefaction probability for a given 
susceptibility level and PGA at the location of the pipe segment (Table 3.4).    
(Seed and Idriss, 1982) is the moment magnitude (Mw) correction given by: 
           
                            (3.2) 
   (Seed and Idriss, 1982)  is the groundwater correction for depths (  ) given by: 
                 (3.3) 
Due to local variations in soil type or relative density, some portions within a map 
unit may not be susceptible to liquefaction. Each liquefaction susceptibility region is 
considered as a map unit. In Table 3.5, the assumed amount of susceptible portions in 
each map unit is given as probability factors (   ) associated with susceptibility 
categories. The coefficient is applied given that all natural geological units or 
manmade fills have a range of different liquefaction susceptibilities due to soil type, 
grain size distribution, or relative density within the map unit. The suggested 
liquefaction susceptibility values quantify the likelihood of susceptible conditions 
existing at any given location within the corresponding map unit. 
Table 3.4 : Conditional probability formulations (Liao et al., 1988). 
Susceptibility P (Liquefaction |PGA = a) 
Very High 0  9.09a – 0.82  1.0 
High 0  7.67a – 0.92  1.0 
Moderate 0  6.67a – 1.0  1.0 
Low 0  5.57a – 1.18  1.0 
Very Low 0  4.16a – 1.08  1.0 
None 0.0 
35 
Table 3.5 : Proportion of map units susceptible to liquefaction (FEMA, 2003). 
Mapped Relative 
Susceptibility 
Proportion of 
Map Unit 
Very High 0.25 
High 0.20 
Moderate 0.10 
Low 0.05 
Very Low 0.02 
None 0.0 
Expected permanent ground displacements due to lateral spreading can be calculated 
using the following equation: 
 (   )      (   |(     ⁄ )) (3.4) 
where  (   |(     ⁄ )) is the expected PGD, developed by Youd and Perkins 
(1987) and Sadigh et al. (1986). It is tabulated in Joyner and Boore (1988) for a 
given susceptibility category under a specified level of normalized ground shaking, 
calculated from       ( )⁄  (Figure 3.2).    ( ) is the threshold ground 
acceleration corresponding to zero probability of liquefaction (Table 3.6).    (Seed 
and Idriss, 1982) is the displacement correction factor given by: 
 (   )      (   |(     ⁄ )) (3.5) 
 
Figure 3.2 : Function for lateral spreading (FEMA, 2003). 
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Table 3.6 : Threshold PGA values for susceptibility levels (FEMA, 2003). 
Susceptibility Category PGA (t) 
 Very High 0.09g 
High 0.12g 
Moderate 0.15g 
Low 0.21g 
Very Low 0.26g 
None N/A 
g: Gravitational acceleration 
Liquefaction induced ground settlement is related to the susceptibility category of an 
area. Ground settlement amplitudes are given for levels of liquefaction susceptibility 
in Table 3.7. The expected settlement at a location is calculated as the product of the 
liquefaction probability and the ground settlement amplitude appropriate to the 
susceptibility category at that location (FEMA, 2003). 
Table 3.7 : Settlements for liquefaction susceptibility levels (FEMA, 2003). 
Relative Susceptibility Settlement (inches) 
 Very High 12 
High 6 
Moderate 2 
Low 1 
Very Low 0 
None 0 
3.1.2 Inventory 
Interdependent network performance analysis inventory is divided in to five classes 
as electric power network facilities, electric power network lines, water network 
facilities, natural gas network facilities, and buried pipelines. Each inventory class is 
explained in this section. 
Power facilities consist of electric power network structures. These include power 
plants, substations, and transformer stations. Inventory items are classified by facility 
type and capacity (Table 3.8). Additionally, electric power network line datasets 
contain the power lines connecting the electric power facilities. No structural damage 
is assessed for power lines, thus no classification is needed. Power lines specify the 
power network connectivity for the topological model.  
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Table 3.8 : Electric power network facility classification. 
Label Description 
 Pumping Plants 
PPPL Large Pumping Plant (>50 MGD) 
PPPM Medium Pumping Plant (10-50 MGD) 
PPPS Small Pumping Plant (<10 MGD) 
 Wells 
PWE Water Well 
 Water Storage Tanks 
PSTAS Above-Ground Steel Tank 
PSTBC Buried Concrete Tank 
PSTGC On-Ground Concrete Tank 
PSTGS On-Ground Steel Tank 
PSTGW On-Ground Wood Tank 
 Water Treatment Plants 
PWTL Large Water Treatment Plant (>200 MGD) 
PWTM Medium Water treatment Plant (50-200 MGD) 
PWTS Small Water Treatment Plant (<50 MGD) 
PDFLT Default Facility (Unspecified/Unclassified) 
 MGD: Million Gallons per Day 
Water network facilities consist of water network structures. These include wells, 
pumping plants, treatment plants, and water tanks. Inventory items are classified by 
facility type, capacity, and availability of backup power (Table 3.9). 
Table 3.9 : Water network facility classification. 
Label Description 
 Pumping Plants 
PPPL Large Pumping Plant (>50 MGD) 
PPPM Medium Pumping Plant (10-50 MGD) 
PPPS Small Pumping Plant (<10 MGD) 
 Wells 
PWE Water Well 
 Water Storage Tanks 
PSTAS Above-Ground Steel Tank 
PSTBC Buried Concrete Tank 
PSTGC On-Ground Concrete Tank 
PSTGS On-Ground Steel Tank 
PSTGW On-Ground Wood Tank 
 Water Treatment Plants 
PWTL Large Water Treatment Plant (>200 MGD) 
PWTM Medium Water treatment Plant (50-200 MGD) 
PWTS Small Water Treatment Plant (<50 MGD) 
PDFLT Default Facility (Unspecified/Unclassified) 
 MGD: Million Gallons per Day 
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Natural gas network facilities consist of natural gas network structures. These 
include gate stations and pressure regulating compressor stations. Inventory items are 
classified by facility type and capacity (Table 3.10). 
Table 3.10 : Natural gas network facility classification. 
Label Description 
NGG Gate Station 
NGC Compressor Station 
NDFLT Default Facility (Unspecified/Unclassified) 
Water and natural gas network gas network pipeline systems are included in the 
analysis as buried pipeline datasets. Buried pipeline segments are classified by pipe 
material, joint type, pipe diameter, and corrosion effects. Most common pipe 
materials include cast iron, ductile iron, asbestos cement, concrete, steel, PVC, and 
polyethylene. Most common joint types include arc welded, gas welded, riveted, bell 
and spigot, coupled, rubber gasket, screwed, and cemented joints. 
3.1.3 Fragility 
Structural damage levels are estimated by utilizing fragility functions, which give the 
probability that a limit state is exceeded, or by damage functions that indicate the 
amount of expected damage, given an input level of shaking. Three approaches can 
be utilized for the development of those functions: empirical, theoretical, and 
judgment-based. Empirical relationships are obtained by estimating observed seismic 
damage from a site or from laboratory experiments through regression analysis. 
When empirical data is unavailable or insufficient, a theoretical approach is 
employed by modeling the systems with known or estimated capacities. Judgment-
based relationships are developed in the absence of empirical data and theoretical 
models, based on expert opinion (Porter and Kiremidjian, 2001). 
3.1.3.1 Buried pipeline fragilities 
Buried pipeline damage is attributed to transient or permanent ground deformations. 
Transient ground deformations (TGD) occur as a result of wave propagation. Causes 
of permanent ground deformations (PGD), on the other hand, are fault rupture, 
liquefaction, landslides, and ground settlement. 
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Ground shaking generally induces much smaller damage compared to permanent 
deformations. However, since coverage of PGD is local and limited, ground shaking 
induced pipeline damage is generally accepted to be more significant (Toprak and 
Taşkın, 2007). 
The highest correlation between ground motion parameters and buried pipeline 
damage is achieved by implementing PGV parameter. The axial strains in the soil 
causing damage to buried pipelines are correlated with velocity given by the 
following relation: 
   
    
 
 (3.6) 
where    is the earthquake-induced ground strain,      is the maximum ground 
velocity, and   is the seismic wave propagation velocity (Newmark, 1968). Because 
of the soil-pipe interactions, buried pipelines experience a certain percentage of the 
ground strain, resulting in a high correlation between pipeline damage and PGV 
(Toprak and Taşkın, 2007). 
Damage functions for buried pipelines are utilized to estimate the number of repairs 
on a unit length of one segment. Results can be obtained in number of repairs per 
kilometer (O'Rourke and Ayala, 1993; O'Rourke and Jeon, 1999) or number of 
repairs per 1000 feet (Eidinger, 2001). The number of repairs includes those caused 
by both leaks on the pipe or complete ruptures. Damage to pipelines can be induced 
by ground shaking, ground failure due to liquefaction, landslides, fault rupture, or 
settlement. Ground shaking indicates transient deformations of soil due to seismic 
wave propagation and is defined in terms of peak ground velocity. Ground failure 
accounts for the permanent displacement of the soil profiles. These displacements 
may occur due to settlement at transition zones where soil properties change, at fault 
rupture areas, or at liquefaction areas. Displacements are defined in terms of 
permanent ground deformation (Eidinger, 2001). 
Eidinger (2001) specifies two types of models for pipeline fragility formulations: 
linear (median) and power models. In the linear models, the repair rate (RR) is a 
linear function of seismic hazard (PGV or PGD) in the form of:  
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       (3.7) 
where   is the median line slope of data points of observed damage, and   is the 
seismic hazard value. Power models, on the other hand, have the following form: 
        (3.8) 
where   and   are coefficients determined using the linear least squares method on 
    . 
Table 3.11 shows the pipeline damage functions for ground shaking. Each equation 
represents expected damage to certain pipe segments according to pipeline inventory 
data from which they are derived. Fragility assignments are made according to pipe 
material, joint type, pipe diameter, and soil corrosiveness, if specified. Coefficients 
of (Eidinger, 2001) functions for different pipe properties are given in Table 3.12.  
The most severe damage to buried pipelines is caused by permanent ground 
deformation (PGD). Liquefaction-induced PGD, especially lateral spreading, is one 
of the most common causes of seismic lifeline damage (O'Rourke et al., 2001).  
 The damage algorithm for pipelines due to ground failure uses damage functions 
based on the study by Honegger and Eguchi (1992) as implemented in the HAZUS 
methodology. The damage function is formulated as: 
  (         ⁄ )     (            )          (3.9) 
where   is the coefficient used in the (O'Rourke and Ayala, 1993) equation.   is 
equal to 1 for brittle pipe materials such as cast iron, and 0.3 for ductile pipe 
materials such as steel or PVC.  (            ) is the probability of liquefaction 
occurring where the pipe segment is located, and PGD is expressed in inches. 
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Table 3.11 : Buried pipeline fragilities (Steelman et al., 2007). 
Researcher 
Source 
Earthquake 
Material Backbone Fragility Curve 
Non - Dimensional 
Coefficient (K) 
Required 
Mapping 
Data 
Notes 
(O'Rourke and 
Jeon, 1999) 
Northridge 
Earthquake 
(1994) 
Cast-Iron         (          )      N/A 
Pipe material, 
diameter 
RR : Repairs / Km 
Ductile Iron          (          )      N/A 
Pipe material, 
diameter 
PGV : cm/sec 
Asbestos 
Cement 
   (  )           ( )       N/A 
Pipe material, 
diameter 
D: cm 
Asbestos 
Cement 
   (  )          (   )        N/A Pipe material PGV : cm / sec 
(O'Rourke and 
Ayala, 1993) 
11 data points 
from 4 U.S. and 
2 Mexican 
Earthquakes 
All             (   )     
1.0 - Cast Iron, 
Asbestos, Cement, 
Concrete 
 
0.3 - Steel, Ductile 
Iron, PVC 
Pipe material 
 
RR Repairs / Km 
PGV: cm / sec 
(Eidinger, 2001) 
81 data points 
from 18 
Earthquakes 
All                 
Depends on Material 
Joint Type, Soil 
Condition and 
Diameter 
Pipe material, 
diameter, joint 
type, soils  
(see Table 2) 
PGV: in / sec 
RR : Repairs / 1000 
ft 
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Damage functions for pipelines give pipeline damage in number of repairs per one 
kilometer of pipe segment. Estimated repairs consist of the combined numbers of 
pipe leaks and breaks. For damage caused by ground shaking (PGV-induced 
damage), 80% of the repairs are assumed to be leaks, whereas 20% are assumed to be 
pipe breaks. In the case of liquefaction damage (PGD-induced), amount of breaks are 
assumed to be 80%, and leaks to be 20%. MAEViz generates fields for total leak, 
break, and repair rates for each segment in the data table and calculates the values. 
Number of repairs for each segment is obtained by multiplication of pipe lengths and 
repair rates for each segment. Total number of repairs for the network is obtained by 
the summation of these values. 
Table 3.12 : K coefficient for Eidinger (2001) buried pipeline damage functions. 
Pipe Material Joint Type Soils Diameter K 
Cast Iron Cement All Small 1.0 
Cast Iron Cement Corrosive Small 1.4 
Cast Iron Cement Non-corrosive Small 0.7 
Cast Iron Rubber Gasket All Small 0.8 
Welded Steel Lap – Arc Welded All Small 0.6 
Welded Steel Lap – Arc Welded Corrosive Small 0.9 
Welded Steel Lap – Arc Welded Non-corrosive Small 0.3 
Welded Steel Lap – Arc Welded All Large 0.2 
Welded Steel Rubber Gasket All Small  0.7 
Welded Steel Screwed All Small 1.3 
Welded Steel Riveted All Small 1.3 
Asbestos Cement Rubber Gasket All Small 0.5 
Asbestos Cement Cement All Small 1.0 
Concrete w/Steel Cylinder Lap – Arc Welded All Large 0.7 
Concrete w/Steel Cylinder Rubber Gasket All Large 1.0 
Concrete w/Steel Cylinder Rubber Gasket All Large 0.8 
PVC Rubber Gasket All Small 0.5 
Ductile Iron Rubber Gasket All Small 0.5 
In order to be able to model the pipeline failure in the interdependent network 
analysis tool, a probabilistic approach is followed assuming that the breaks constitute 
a Poisson process. The model proposed by Duenas-Osorio (2005), and implemented 
by Kim et al. (2008) suggests that at least one break on a pipe segment is assumed to 
impair the segment, and the probability of at least one break occurring on a segment 
is calculated as: 
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 (    )     (    )     
      (3.10) 
where    is the number of breaks,    is the break rate in breaks per kilometer, and   
is the pipe length. 
3.1.3.2 Network facility fragilities 
Damage predictions are given in terms of the probability of a structure being in a 
particular damage state by implementing fragility curves. Fragility information for 
electric power, water, and natural gas network structures are taken from HAZUS 
methodology (FEMA, 2003). Four ranges of limit states are utilized to describe the 
degree of damage to structures: slight (S), moderate (M), extensive (E), and complete 
(C). The fragilities are defined with a log-normal distribution with median and 
standard deviation (β) parameters for the calculation of limit states: 
 (   |     )   (
  ( )    (      )
 
) (3.11) 
where a is the demand peak ground acceleration read from hazard maps,   represents 
the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and  (   |     ) is the 
conditional probability of exceeding the i
th
 limit state given the hazard      . The 
range and severity of damage to the network structures is defined by five damage 
states: none, slight, moderate, extensive, and complete. 
 (    )   (    ) (3.12) 
 (    )   (    )   (    ) (3.13) 
 (    )   (    )   (    ) (3.14) 
 (    )   (    )   (    ) (3.15) 
 (    )     (    ) (3.16) 
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PGD-induced liquefaction damage estimation for buildings, which also utilizes the 
log-normal cumulative distribution function, is used to calculate the probability of 
exceeding limit states for ground failure with a median value of   (  ) for 
permanent ground displacement. Standard deviation is taken as 1.2. The probability 
of ground failure caused by liquefaction is calculated as: 
   (   )     (
  (   )    (  )
   
)   (            ) (3.17) 
Combined limit state probabilities resulting from ground shaking and ground failure 
are calculated by the following equations: 
     (    )   (    )     (   )     (   )   (    ) (3.18) 
     (    )   (    )     (   )     (   )   (    ) (3.19) 
     (    )   (    )     (   )     (   )   (    ) (3.20) 
     (    )   (    )     (   )     (   )   (    ) (3.21) 
Damage probabilities by combined ground shaking and ground failure are calculated 
by putting the combined limit state probabilities into equations (3.12) through (3.16) 
instead of limit state probabilities due to ground shaking (Steelman et al., 2007). 
Thus, probabilities of occurrence of each damage state due to combined ground 
shaking and ground failure become: 
 (    )       (    ) (3.22) 
 (    )       (    )       (    ) (3.23) 
 (    )       (    )       (    ) (3.24) 
 (    )       (    )       (    ) (3.25) 
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 (    )         (    ) (3.26) 
As failure criteria in the interdependent network analysis tool, network components 
are accepted to have at least extensive damage for losing functionality (Kim et al., 
2007). The probability for a structure to experience at least extensive damage is 
calculated using the values from the fragility curves of the appropriate structural type 
given for extensive damage limit state.  
In estimating the liquefaction damage, same fragility curves for buildings are 
assigned to network components. The four limit states in ground shaking damage are 
simplified for ground failure to account for the combined extensive and complete 
damage states. A single fragility curve is utilized for all network components with a 
median of 60 inches and a standard deviation of 1.2. HAZUS methodology suggests 
that, due to ground failure, structures either remain undamaged or experience 
extensive damage; and slight or moderate damage is considered less likely and 
relatively small compared to ground shaking damage (FEMA, 2003). 
Table 3.13 gives the fragility curve parameters assigned for various types of wells, 
plants, and tank in water networks. According to FEMA (2003), slight damage state 
for water network components indicates: 
 Malfunction for short periods, light damage to tanks and basins, and possible 
loss of water quality for plants; 
 Malfunction of pumps for short periods for wells; 
 Minor damage without loss of content and functionality, and minor cracks or 
wrinkles for water tanks. 
Moderate damage state for water network components indicates: 
 Malfunction for about a week, considerable damage to equipment, basins, and 
tanks, and loss of water quality for plants; 
 Malfunction of pumps for longer periods and considerable equipment damage 
for wells; 
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 Considerable damage with minor content loss, moderate cracking or elephant 
foot buckling for water tanks.  
Extensive damage state for water network components indicates: 
 Major damage to equipment, basins, tanks, and pipelines connecting them, 
damage to pumps beyond repair, and complete shutdown for plants; 
 Damage and non-functionality of vertical shaft and pump, and severe 
building damage for wells; 
 Heavy damage and non-serviceability, loss of content, elephant foot buckling 
and shearing of walls for water tanks. 
Complete damage state for water network components indicates: 
 Complete failure of all pipelines and equipment and building collapse for 
plants; 
 Building collapse for wells; 
 Content loss and collapse for tanks. 
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Table 3.13 : Fragility parameters for water network facilities. 
Network Facility 
Slight Moderate Extensive Complete 
Median / Standard Deviation (PGA) 
Water Network 
Wells (without Backup Power) 0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Wells (with Backup Power) 0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Small Water Treatment Plant ( < 50 
MGD ) (without Backup Power) 
0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Small Water Treatment Plant ( < 50 
MGD ) (with Backup Power) 
0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Medium Water Treatment Plant ( 50-
200 MGD ) (without Backup Power) 
0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Medium Water Treatment Plant ( 50-
200 MGD ) (with Backup Power) 
0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Large Water Treatment Plant ( > 200 
MGD ) (without Backup Power) 
0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Large Water Treatment Plant ( > 200 
MGD ) (with Backup Power) 
0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Small Pumping Plant ( < 10 MGD ) 
(without Backup Power) 
0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Small Pumping Plant ( < 10 MGD ) 
(with Backup Power) 
0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Medium Pumping Plant ( 10 to 50 
MGD ) (without Backup Power) 
0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Medium Pumping Plant ( 10 to 50 
MGD ) (with Backup Power) 
0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Large Pumping Plant ( > 50 MGD ) 
(without Backup Power) 
0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Large Pumping Plant ( > 50 MGD ) 
(with Backup Power) 
0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Buried Concrete Tank (without Backup 
Power) 
0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Buried Concrete Tank (with Backup 
Power) 
0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
On Ground Wood Tank (without 
Backup Power) 
0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
On Ground Wood Tank (with Backup 
Power) 
0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
On Ground Concrete Tank (without 
Backup Power) 
0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
On Ground Concrete Tank  (with 
Backup Power) 
0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
On Ground Steel Tank (without Backup 
Power) 
0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
On Ground Steel Tank (with Backup 
Power) 
0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Above Ground Steel Tank (without 
Backup Power) 
0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Above Ground Steel Tank  (with 
Backup Power) 
0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Default Facility 0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
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Table 3.14 gives the fragility curve parameters assigned for various types of power 
plants, substations, and transformers in electric power networks. According to FEMA 
(2003), slight damage state for electric power network components indicates: 
 Failure of 5% of circuits or equipment, and minor damage to the building for 
transformers and substations; 
 Minor damage to diesel generator or the building for power plants. 
Moderate damage state for electric power network components indicates: 
 Failure of 40% of circuits or equipment, oil leak or porcelain cracks on 
transformers, and considerable damage to the building for transformers and 
substations; 
 Considerable damage to racks, panels, boilers, and vessels, or considerable 
damage to building for power plants. 
Extensive damage state for electric power network components indicates: 
 Failure of 70% of circuits or equipment, oil leak or porcelain cracks on 
transformers, transformer failure, and heavy damage to the building for 
transformers and substations; 
 Considerable damage to vertical and motor driven pumps or heavy damage to 
building for power plants. 
Complete damage state for electric power network components indicates: 
 Failure of all circuits and equipment, and building collapse for transformers 
and substations; 
 Heavy damage to vessels and valves beyond repair, or building collapse for 
power plants.  
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Table 3.14 : Fragility parameters for electric power network facilities. 
Network Facility 
Slight Moderate Extensive Complete 
Median / Standard Deviation (PGA) 
Power Network 
Small Power Plants ( < 100 MW ) 
(without Backup Power) 
0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Small Power Plants ( < 100 MW ) 
(with Backup Power) 
0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Medium Power Plants ( 100 - 500 
MW ) (without Backup Power) 
0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Medium Power Plants ( 100 - 500 
MW ) (with Backup Power) 
0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Large Power Plants ( > 500 MW ) 
(without Backup Power) 
0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Large Power Plants ( > 500 MW ) 
(with Backup Power) 
0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Low Voltage (115 KV) Substation 
(without Backup Power) 
0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Low Voltage (115 KV) Substation 
(with Backup Power) 
0.35 / 0.60 0.50 / 0.60 0.80 / 0.60 1.45 / 0.65 
Medium Voltage (230 KV) 
Substation (without Backup Power) 
0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Medium Voltage (230 KV) 
Substation (with Backup Power) 
0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
High Voltage (500 KV) Substation 
(without Backup Power) 
0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
High Voltage (500 KV) Substation 
(with Backup Power) 
0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Transformer - Anchored - 100V 0.75 / 0.70 0.75 / 0.70 0.75 / 0.70 0.75 / 0.70 
Transformer - Unanchored - 100V 0.50 / 0.70 0.50 / 0.70 0.50 / 0.70 0.50 / 0.70 
Transformer - Anchored - 165V 0.60 / 0.70 0.60 / 0.70 0.60 / 0.70 0.60 / 0.70 
Transformer - Unanchored - 165V 0.30 / 0.70  0.30 / 0.70  0.30 / 0.70  0.30 / 0.70  
Transformer - Unanchored - 500V 0.25 / 0.70  0.25 / 0.70  0.25 / 0.70  0.25 / 0.70  
Transformer - Anchored - 500V 0.40 / 0.70 0.40 / 0.70 0.40 / 0.70 0.40 / 0.70 
Default Facility 0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Table 3.15 gives the fragility curve parameters assigned for natural gas gate and 
compressor stations. According to FEMA (2003), slight damage state for natural gas 
gate and compressor stations indicates minor damage to station building; moderate 
damage state indicates considerable damage to station building and 
mechanical/electrical equipment; extensive damage state indicates major damage to 
the station building and damage on equipment and pumps beyond repair; complete 
damage state indicates building collapse. 
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Table 3.15 : Fragility parameters for natural gas network facilities. 
Network Facility 
Slight Moderate Extensive Complete 
Median / Standard Deviation (PGA) 
Natural Gas Network 
Facilities With Unanchored 
Components 
0.12 / 0.60 0.24 / 0.60 0.77 / 0.65 1.50 / 0.80 
Facilities With Anchored 
Components 
0.15 / 0.75 0.34 / 0.65 0.77 / 0.65 1.50 / 0.80 
Default Facility 0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
3.2 Topological Model 
Utilizing in-depth definitions of inventory attributes, finely detailed mappings of 
state-of-the-art fragility information, and elaborate hazard maps developed using 
modern attenuation models with detailed site and source definitions results in 
detailed identification of critical components of lifeline networks. However, knowing 
the physical state of a network is not sufficient to make predictions regarding its 
operational loss after disruptions. Interdependent performance analysis tools for 
topological networks are employed to simulate the post-seismic conditions of the 
analyzed networks by applying connectivity and flow algorithms. With the 
interdependent approach, lifeline networks are modeled as a mutually dependent 
system of systems where the state of one network is influenced by another. 
Topology, in geographic information systems, defines the interaction between 
objects independent from their geometry. One of the most significant outcomes of 
topology in a GIS is to be able to perform network analyses, neighborhood analyses, 
and similar related analytical processes without needing spatial information 
(Yomralıoğlu, 2005). 
3.2.1 Data structure 
Topological data structure provided by modern GIS software supports three main 
functions: connectivity, area definition, and contiguity. And these functions are 
supported with three basic topological data structures: arc-node, polygon-arc, and 
left-right. Arc-node structure is utilized to handle connectivity models such as road, 
transportation, utility lifelines, and telecommunication networks where the order of 
links and connecting nodes on a route is important. Polygon-arc structure is the data 
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structure to store area definition functionality in the database. It defines the relations 
between areas and surrounding arcs such as coastlines or borders. Left-right structure 
provides contiguity (neighborhood) functionality where information on polygons 
surrounding neighboring polygons is stored such as administrative units which are 
neighbors to other units, or buildings that have sides facing to a road, etc. 
(Yomralıoğlu, 2005).  
The principles of geospatial topology are based on graph theory. The networks must 
be represented as directed graphs for the analysis tool. A graph can be described as a 
pair   (   ) of sets where   is defined as the set of vertices, and   is defined as 
the set of edges. Each element of   is also a 2-element subset of  . Convenient 
visual representation of graphs is done by joining two vertices with a line (Figure 
3.3). The idea of graphs is to give information on which pairs of vertices form the 
edges in the networks (Diestel, 2000). 
 
Figure 3.3 : An example graph G = (V,E). 
The following graph is a graph on vertex set                     with an edge set 
     (   ) (   ) (   ) (   ) (   ) . Vertex set of a graph is referred as  ( ), 
whereas its edge set is referred as  ( ). A graph is defined as connected if any two 
vertices of a graph are always connected with a path. Moreover, if every edge in a 
graph is assigned an initial and terminal vertex, defining all flow directions, such a 
graph is defined as a directed graph. Analyzed networks are built as directed graphs 
representing electric power, potable water, and natural gas lifeline systems. The 
networks generally consist of buried pipelines, power lines, power plants, 
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substations, water wells, pumping stations, water tanks, natural gas pressure 
regulator stations, gate stations, etc. 
Each node in the topological network is assigned to either one of three types 
according to their roles in the physical network: generation, intermediary, and 
distribution. 
 Generation Nodes: They are the network facilities where network flow is 
originated from. Supplier facilities like water wells in potable water networks, 
power plants in electric power networks, and gate stations in urban natural 
gas networks are defined in the topological model as origin nodes.  
 Distribution Nodes: They are the discharge nodes of the networks where the 
flow is supplied to the end users. Transformers in electric power distribution 
networks and water tanks in water transmission networks are defined in the 
topological model as destination nodes. 
 Intermediary Nodes: They are the nodes in the network without any 
generation or discharge. Incoming flow is transmitted without any change. 
Pressure regulator pumps and water tanks in water distribution networks, 
pressure regulator stations in natural gas networks, and all types of junctions 
are defined in the topological model as intermediary nodes. 
3.2.2 Interdependent failure mechanism 
The interdependency mechanism can be explained with an example of a power and a 
water system given in Figure 3.4. The electric power requirements of water nodes are 
provided by the power distribution nodes. In the given system, power and water 
systems operate simultaneously, but not independently. Electric power is produced 
and supplied into the power network by power generation nodes (   ). Flowing 
through intermediary nodes (   ), the flow reaches the power distribution nodes 
(   ) which provide electric power to the nodes of other networks operating with 
electric power. Water network dependencies are defined as connections between 
power distribution nodes and water generation (   ) or intermediary nodes (   ). 
Examples of electric power operated water generation and intermediary nodes can be 
given as water wells and pressure regulating water pumps, respectively. Each 
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connection between power and water nodes represent a dependency and is quantified 
with a dependency level (   ) varying between 0 and 1 where 0 stands for total 
independency, and 1 stands for complete dependency. Dependency levels determine 
the functional behavior of water network nodes in case the failure of power 
distribution nodes supplying electricity to them. 
 
Figure 3.4 : An example for illustrating network interdependency. 
Failure of a network node can either be structural or operational. Operational failure 
can further be divided into two as non-functionality of a node due to loss of 
connectivity within the network and non-functionality due to failure of all feeder 
electric power nodes. This condition implies that a node can still fail due to 
interdependency effects although being structurally undamaged. 
If the event     denotes the failure of i
th
 power node, it can be defined as the union 
of structural failure caused by earthquake damage (   
 ) and operational failure, 
which can again be defined as the union of two events: Failure induced by loss of 
network connectivity (   
 ) and interdependent failure induced by the failure of all 
feeding electric power nodes (   
 ). 
       
     
     
  (3.27) 
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 , failure caused by the interdependency effect, requires the failure of every node 
within the set of power nodes (   ) which water node i is dependent (    
).     
 is 
defined as: 
    
 ⋂    
     
 
(3.28) 
where     is the failure of the j
th
 power node, which can similarly be defined as the 
union of two events: 
       
     
  (3.29) 
where     is the failure of the j
th
 power node due to earthquake damage, and    
  is 
the non-functionality of the j
th
 power node because of the failure of the nodes that 
feed electric power to the node. 
 (   
 |    
)               (3.30) 
3.2.3 Network performance measures 
Interdependent system behavior can be assessed by simulating the system response. 
Based on seismic damage assessment results and interdependency definitions 
between systems, post seismic states of the networks are obtained and system 
reliabilities are assessed by utilizing Monte Carlo simulations. In order to measure 
the functional loss of a system when some of the components are likely to be 
dysfunctional, two performance measures are defined quantifying those losses: 
Connectivity Loss (CL), and Service Flow Reduction (SFR). These measures assess 
the network performance with metrics depending on the topological settings of the 
network, or with more detailed metrics depending on supply, demand, and flow 
patterns additional to the topological settings. 
3.2.3.1 Connectivity loss 
Connectivity Loss (CL) measures the ability of every distribution node to receive 
flow from generation nodes (Kim et al., 2008). It is calculated as: 
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 (3.31) 
where   is the number of distribution nodes,      
  is the number of generation 
nodes able to feed flow to the i
th
 distribution node in undisturbed state, and       
  is 
the number of generation nodes able to supply power to the i
th
 distribution node 
under post-seismic conditions. CL only requires the topological setting of the network 
before and after an earthquake. 
3.2.3.2 Service flow reduction 
Service Flow Reduction (SFR) determines the amount of flow that the system can 
provide compared to the demand before the disturbance (Kim et al., 2007). It is 
calculated as: 
      
 
 
∑
  
  
 
   
 (3.32) 
where   is the number of distribution nodes,    is the actual flow at the ith 
distribution node under seismic conditions, and    is the demand at the ith 
distribution node. Since supply, demand, and flow patterns of a network is 
considered in addition to the topo0logical settings, SFR is expected to give better 
estimates of the effects of a seismic event on lifeline utility networks (Kim, 2007). 
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4.  COMPUTER IMPLEMENTATION 
This chapter features the implementation of the studied interdependent network 
performance assessment methodology in computer environment. A brief introduction 
of the common digital data formats utilized to represent hazard, fragility, and 
inventory datasets are followed by the overview of the loss estimation software 
providing the necessary analysis tools for interdependent network performance 
assessment along with the data structure of the software. Analysis algorithms for the 
interdependent network performance analysis, modifications in the interdependency 
model, and effects of the modifications to network performance are also discussed in 
this chapter. 
4.1 Data Formats 
4.1.1 Shapefile (.shp) 
Shapefile is a common vector data format used by GIS programs for storing 
geospatial information. The format is developed and regulated by the Environmental 
Systems Research Institute (ESRI), the vendor of widely-used GIS software called 
ArcGIS. A shapefile stores the geometry of spatial features as shapes comprising sets 
of vector coordinates, in addition to attribute information regarding the features. GIS 
datasets stored as shapefiles can be handled in one of three types: point, polyline, and 
polygon. Data type of a shapefile is defined at its creation and a shapefile can only 
contain that single type of objects (ESRI, 1997). Point data are represented with 
double precision coordinate pairs which indicate the spatial location of objects (Table 
4.1).  
Table 4.1 : Data structure for point shapefile. 
Type: Point  
Header Explanation 
Double X X Coordinate of the object 
Double Y Y Coordinate of the object 
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Polylines consist of ordered sets of points forming one or more parts which are 
connected sequences of multiple points. Parts of a polyline may or may not intersect 
or be connected to each other. A polyline object is defined by its bounding box, a list 
of points forming the polyline, and a list of parts comprised of the points (Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2 : Data structure for polyline shapefile. 
Type: Polyline  
Header Explanation 
Double[4] Box 
Coordinates of the bounding box for the 
polyline in the order Xmin, Ymin, Xmax, Ymax 
Integer NumParts Number of parts in the polyline 
Integer NumPoints Number of points for all parts 
Integer[NumParts] Parts 
An array storing the index of the first point of 
each part from the points array 
Point[NumPoints] Points 
An array storing the points for all parts of the 
polyline (starting point of each part) 
Polygons consist of rings which are closed sequences of four or more points forming 
a closed loop that do not intersect it. A polygon may contain multiple inner or outer 
rings forming a single or multiple closed shapes. The order of vertices for a ring 
determines the interior of a ring. The interior is the right side of the direction of 
increasing vertex order. This rule implies that vertices of a single polygon are 
ordered clockwise; whereas the vertices of rings that represent holes inside of the 
polygons are in counterclockwise direction. A polygon object is defined by its 
bounding box, a list of points forming the polygon, and a list of parts comprised of 
the points (Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3 : Data structure for polygon shapefile. 
Type: Polygon  
Header Explanation 
Double[4] Box 
Coordinates of the bounding box for the 
polygon in the order Xmin, Ymin, Xmax, Ymax 
Integer NumParts Number of rings in the polygon 
Integer NumPoints Number of points for all rings 
Integer[NumParts] Parts 
An array storing the index of the first point of 
each ring from the points array  
Point[NumPoints] Points 
An array storing the points for all rings of the 
polygon. The parts array holds the array index 
of the starting point of each ring. 
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A shapefile is a group of several files in the same folder, three of which are 
mandatory files consisting of the essential information to make up a shapefile. 
Although the most recent and common GIS software don’t require the files to be 
named according to the MS-DOS 8.3 file name convention (Url-1), it is appropriate 
to name the files with a maximum 8-character-long file name and a 3-character-long 
file extension for compatibility with all applications able to hand shapefiles. 
Mandatory files are: 
 .shp: Shape file featuring the geometry. 
 .shx: Positional shape index of the feature geometry allowing quick forwards 
and backwards searches. 
 .dbf: Database file containing the attribute tables for each shape. 
Optional files are: 
 .prj: A text file containing the coordinate system and projection information. 
 .sbn / .sbx: Spatial index of the features. 
 .fbn / .fbx: Spatial index of the read-only features for shapefiles. 
 .ain / .aih: An index of the active fields in the attribute table. 
 .ixs / .mxs: Geocoding index for shapefiles. 
 .atx: An attribute index for the .dbf file (for ArcGIS 8 and later). 
 .shp.xml: Metadata file in XML format. 
 .cpg: A file for the .dbf file specifying the code page to identify the character 
encoding. 
A sample water network consisting of shapefiles is given in Figure 4.1 below. The 
figure is displayed as a result of overlaying three shapefiles. In the figure, red, green, 
and white objects representing network facilities are in point data format; black 
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objects representing water pipes are in polyline data format; and the grey area 
representing an administrative unit is in polygon data format.  
 
Figure 4.1 : Sample shapefile data for point, polyline, and polygon formats. 
4.1.2 ASCII raster (.asc) 
Raster data is used in field-based computational models where space is divided into 
regular units with fixed locations, most commonly into square grids. Field values can 
be gathered via either remote sensing or map algebra in which the grid units contain 
spatial variables for the locations they fall on. Raster data is used as input and output 
variables in raster algebra where the computations are based on a cell-by-cell basis 
(Warf, 2006). 
ASCII raster is a GIS raster format to represent data in a grid structure defining the 
geographic space as equally sized square cells arranged in rows and columns. Each 
cell stores a numeric value representing an attribute related to the geographic space 
of that cell referenced with a pair of X and Y coordinates.  
The first six lines of an ASCII Raster file indicate the reference information of the 
grid, and the remaining of the file contains the cell values starting from the upper left 
corner. The data structure of a common ASCII Raster file is given inFigure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2 : Structure of an ASCII raster dataset. 
In an ASCII raster dataset, ncols and nrows are integer values setting the number of 
columns and rows in the grid; xllcorner and yllcorner are real numbers representing 
the X and Y coordinates of the lower left corner cell; cellsize is a real number 
representing the length of one side of a square cell, also known as cell resolution; and 
nodata_value is a real number representing the cell value to be regarded as missing 
or not applicable. Remaining portion of the file contains the cell values starting from 
the upper left corner of the grid, delimited with a single space (Url-2). 
4.1.3 Extensible markup language (.xml) 
Extensible markup language (XML) is used to represent data so that it can be shared 
among different kinds of applications and operating systems. XML provides an 
efficient and effective way to store, retrieve, and exchange information between 
peers. Origins of XML date back in 1960s when IBM developed Generalized 
Markup Language (GML) to present a method to integrate information in law 
offices. It had been transformed into an all-purpose markup language, Standard 
Generalized Markup Language (SGML), in 1974. However, the complexity of 
SGML led to the development of a new standard named Hyper Text Markup 
Language (HTML) consisting of a limited set of standard tags to display information. 
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), in 1998, agreed on the XML standard, a 
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customizable markup language which is simpler to utilize and able to operate with 
HTML. As opposed to standard tagging in HTML, XML format allows users to 
define their own tags to describe data. This flexibility enables users to develop their 
own standard tags particular to their interest and make data available to other 
applications. Applications refer to the tag sets in order to extract information from 
the XML document. Since the data descriptions are already provided in the 
document, there is no need to prepare or exchange additional descriptions (Keogh 
and Davidson, 2005). 
An XML document is structured in a nested manner implying the hierarchy between 
tags. To illustrate the data structure of an XML document, an example of a fragility 
mapping file is given in Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3 : Structure of an XML document. 
The <mapping-dataset>, and <match-filter-map> tags in the XML document 
contain information about all matching rules for buried pipeline seismic damage 
analysis. The <property-match> tag contains the rules for one individual match 
within <filter> and <success-value> tags, which provide the selection filters and 
matching fragility IDs for the filtered elements, respectively. The tag <statement> 
sets the filter statements by defining rules such as pipe diameter, pipe type, pipe 
joint, or corrosivity conditions. The filtered out pipes that meet the conditions must 
be matched with a specific fragility or damage function. The mapping entries, which 
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are provided in <entry> tags under <map>, define the assigned fragility IDs to the 
selection. 
4.1.4 Comma-separated values (.csv) 
Comma separated value (CSV) format is utilized to exchange and convert data 
between spreadsheet or database applications. While numerous implementations are 
present for the format, there is no formal specification, resulting in a wide variety of 
interpretations. This causes considerable differences among implementations. 
Generally each record is located on a separate line, delimited by a line break. An 
optional header may be provided as the first line with the same format as the record 
lines. The header must contain names corresponding to the individual fields in one 
record and must contain the same number of fields with the records. Each line must 
contain the same number of fields throughout the file and the last field in each record 
shouldn’t be followed by a comma (Shafranovich, 2005). An example for a CSV 
document is given with an interdependency table shown in Figure 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.4 : Structure of an CSV document. 
The field names are defined on the first line telling that the first field is the power 
node ID, second is water node ID, and the third is the degree of connectivity between 
them varying from 0 to 1. The second line defines how the information in the fields 
would be read by MAEviz. Data entries start from the third line and a single line 
contains connectivity information between one power and water node. 
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4.2 MAEViz 
MAEviz is an analysis environment developed as a result of combined efforts of the 
Mid-America Earthquake Center (MAE Center) and the National Center for 
Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) to develop analysis tools for researchers, 
practitioners, and decision-makers via integration of most recent research, up-to-date 
inventory data, and state-of-the-art analysis methodologies. Analysis tools provided 
by MAEviz can be effectively utilized for the damage synthesis process within the 
CRM methodology. CRM methodology is applied in MAEviz by performing damage 
assessments using scientific and engineering principles, comparison of alternative 
retrofitting and mitigation scenarios, and system performance modeling to assess 
seismic impact on lifeline, social, or economic systems (Steelman and Hajjar, 2008). 
MAEViz provides seismic analysis tools for building damage, bridge damage, utility 
lifelines damage and performance, transportation network performance, GIS, 
decision support, and socio-economic models. It is an open-source, network-aware, 
and extensible application which is working on Java Eclipse software development 
platform. The modular and open-source structure of MAEViz enables the addition of 
most recently developed methodologies, providing state-of-the-art analysis tools and 
opportunities for the validation and improvement of existing methodologies 
simultaneously. The plug-in system of MAEViz enables the addition of new analysis 
tools by end-users or third party developers when new concepts, methodologies, or 
data become available; making it possible to have a continuously up-to-date analysis 
environment. The MAEViz cyber-environment addresses to both researchers and 
decision makers by practical capabilities to model earthquake scenarios, develop risk 
reduction strategies by testing possible outcomes of different mitigation scenarios 
(Myers et al., 2005). 
Along with its remote data access and analysis interaction capabilities, MAEViz is 
also fully capable of running analyses locally using local data to provide rapid 
assessment in states of emergency. With all of its mentioned capabilities, MAEViz is 
a valuable tool for researchers, policy makers, and decision makers (Elnashai et al., 
2008).  
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4.2.1 MAEViz data structure 
MAEViz has certain standards and requirements for storage, handling, and 
management of inventory, fragility, and hazard datasets. Since there exists datasets 
which are used by multiple analysis tools, establishment of data standards is a 
necessity. During data ingestion, the user must map the existing attributes of the 
imported dataset with the required attributes accordingly. Units of any numeric input 
must also be specified for the conversion taking place in ingestion as part of data 
standardization. User datasets to be used in analyses must be ingested prior to the 
analyses, defined in WGS84 coordinate system. 
The inventory and the analysis datasets for the scenarios are stored in data 
repositories. Repositories, which are collections of datasets, can be stored on the 
local disk as local repositories or on a remote server as online repositories. When a 
scenario is built, analysis data can only be added from the repositories. Repositories 
and the datasets in them can be seen and browsed in the catalog view of MAEviz 
(Figure 4.5).  
 
Figure 4.5 : MAEViz catalog view. 
4.2.1.1 Buried pipelines 
Buried pipelines are stored as shapefiles in the inventory in polyline format. Potable 
water and natural gas pipelines are modeled according to this format. The mandatory 
fields for analysis and field definitions for both structural and topological modeling 
are given in Table 4.4.  
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Table 4.4 : Required fields for buried pipeline datasets. 
Field Format Description 
linknwid Long Integer Link ID (unique for each segment)
 2
 
fromnode Long Integer Start (source) node
 2
 
tonode Long Integer End (sink) node
 2
 
direction Short Integer Flow directivity
 2
 
pipetype Text Pipe material
 1
 
jointtype Text Pipe joint type
 1
 
diameter Double Pipe diameter
 1
 
length Double Pipe length
 1
 
soiltype Text Soil corrosivity information
 1
 
capacity Long Integer Flow capacity
 2
 
Used in:             
1
 Structural model; 
2
 Topological model 
4.2.1.2 Lifeline facilities 
Lifeline facilities are stored as shapefiles in the inventory in point format. Water, 
electric power, and natural gas network structures such as electric substations, water 
pumps, water towers, natural gas regulator stations etc. are modeled according to this 
format. The mandatory fields for analysis and field definitions for both structural and 
topological modeling are given in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 : Required fields for lifeline facility datasets. 
Field Format Description 
nodenwid Long Integer Node ID
 2
 
fltytype Short Integer Facility type (network role)
 2
 
strctype Short Integer Structure type
 1
 
utilfcltyc Text Facility Classification
 1
 
flow Double Production or discharge capacity of the facility
 2
 
backuppowe Short Integer Availability of backup power generator
 1,2
 
Used in:             
1
 Structural model; 
2
 Topological model 
4.2.1.3 Utility networks 
Utility networks are built from one buried pipeline and one lifeline facility dataset, 
comprising the nodes and links of the network. The networks must be structured as 
directed graphs for the analysis tool using the information from the relevant fields 
used necessary for the topological model. A graph can be described as a pair 
G=(V,E) of sets where V is the vertex, and E is the edge which its starting node is the 
given vertex. The idea of graphs is to give information on which pairs of vertices 
form the edges in the networks (Diestel, 2000). The graphs are represented in a data 
structure called Forward Star Structure (FSS) which is especially efficient on 
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shortest path implementations because of its organization of network data by nodes 
and arcs leaving each node (Miller and Shaw, 2001). In other words, forward star 
representation provides a data structure by specifying all the outgoing arcs in the 
network. 
 
Figure 4.6 : A directed graph. 
For the directed graph in Figure 4.6, the network can be represented in FSS by 
numbering the arcs first by their starting nodes, then their end nodes. A pointer is 
also allocated to each node as the smallest numbered arc emanating from the node. 
FSS representation of the sample network is given in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7. 
Table 4.6 : Ordered list of arcs for the FSS. 
Arc ID Start Node End Node Cost 
1 1 2  
2 1 3  
3 2 3  
4 2 4  
5 4 3  
Table 4.7 : Pointers to each node in the FSS. 
Node ID Pointer 
1 1 
2 3 
3 5 
4 5 
(5) (6) 
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4.2.1.4 Hazard maps 
Hazard maps must be provided as ASCII raster format in WGS84 coordinate system. 
During data ingestion, hazard maps must be classified as deterministic hazard. User-
generated spectral acceleration (Sa), peak ground acceleration (PGA), peak ground 
velocity (PGV), and permanent ground deformation (PGD) hazard maps can be 
ingested into MAEviz for use in the analyses. The necessary information for hazard 
ingestion is given in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8 : Required parameters for hazard definition. 
Field Description 
hazard Hazard type (PGA, PGV, etc.) 
unit Hazard unit (g, m/s, etc.) 
magnitude Earthquake moment magnitude 
attenuation Attenuation relation used in generation (if available) 
period Wave periods (for Sa) 
4.2.1.5 Fragilities 
Fragility relations and damage functions which are implemented in the analyses are 
provided in XML files. A fragility relation or a damage function is a function that 
describes how one particular feature would respond to corresponding hazards. The 
fragility sets used in network performance analyses can be categorized into two main 
groups: buried pipeline fragilities and lifeline facility fragilities. Buried pipeline 
fragilities for all networks (water and natural gas) are defined and stored with the 
necessary information given in Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9 : Necessary tags for buried pipeline fragilities. 
Tag Description 
DemandUnits Units of the demand parameter (cm/s, in/s, cm, in, etc.) 
ResultUnits Units of the damage output (repairs/km, repairs/1000ft, etc.) 
StructureType General type of structure for the fragility function 
ID Identification number for the function 
Author Academic reference to the developer of the function 
DemandType Type of demand parameter (PGV, PGD, etc.) 
Code Structural code information 
fragility-set-label Labeling information for display 
curve-type Function definition for MAEviz analysis 
expression Mathematical expression of the function 
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Fragility curves for network facility structures are defined different than buried 
pipelines. Similarly, a common form is utilized for all types of facilities for electric 
power, water, and natural gas networks. Fragility curves of network facility 
structures are defined and stored with the necessary information given in Table 4.10. 
Table 4.10 : Necessary tags for network facility fragilities. 
Tag Description 
AnchoredComponents Presence of anchored components 
Description General description of the fragility function 
BackupPower Presence of backup power generator 
DemandUnits Units of the demand parameter (g, in, etc.) 
CategoryId Fragility category definition (power, water, etc.) 
FacilityClass General type of structure for the fragility function 
EquationType Determination of the general form of the fragility 
function  
ID Function identification 
LimitStates Limit state definitions for the provided fragility curves 
DemandType Type of demand parameter (PGA, Sa, PGD, etc.) 
Fragility-set-label Labeling information for display 
fragility-curve-median Median value for the fragility curve 
fragility-curve-beta Beta value for the fragility curve 
Fragility-curve-type Function definition 
4.2.1.6 Fragility mappings 
Each item in the inventory must be matched with a relevant fragility or damage 
function during analyses. Mapping files contain information on what fragility or 
damage functions would be used for certain features based on specific conditions. All 
fragility mapping files used in utility network damage analysis have the same basic 
structure. This basic structure contains three elements: key, value, and rule (Table 
4.11). Several different rules can be defined and combined together to specify and 
match buried pipelines with damage functions in greater detail. Fragility mappings 
are also built and stored in XML format. 
Table 4.11 : Necessary tags for fragility mapping files. 
Tag Description 
Key Definition of the mapping 
Value ID of the matched damage function 
Rule Conditions need to be satisfied in order to be matched 
with a specific damage function (material, diameter, 
age, structure type, availability of backup power, etc.) 
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4.2.1.7 Network interdependency tables 
Network interdependency tables are used to identify the interactions between 
networks in analysis. Each interacting node couple in the analyzed networks are 
shown in Table 4.12 with the degree of dependency between them. Network 
interdependency tables are stored in CSV files and a single table may be utilized to 
define power-water or power-natural gas network interactions. 
Table 4.12 : Necessary fields for network interdependency tables. 
Field Description 
power_dist Power Node ID 
water_gen Water/Natural Gas Node ID 
connected Degree of dependency between the specified nodes 
4.2.2 MAEViz analysis tools 
MAEViz provides users Analysis tools for building structural and non-structural 
damage, direct economic damage, repair cost, and retrofit cost estimation; bridge 
structural damage, functionality, repair cost, and retrofit cost estimation; decision 
support such as equivalent cost analysis, multi-attribute utility analysis, network 
based seismic bridge retrofit analysis using static or dynamic flow models; GIS 
functionality such as data aggregation, appending, comparison, intersection, join, and 
raster slope generation; hazard modeling utilizing deterministic or probabilistic 
methods; lifeline structural damage analysis and interdependent performance 
analysis; and socioeconomic models such as household and population dislocation, 
business loss, fiscal impact, shelter and supply requirements, temporary housing, and 
social vulnerability. All MAEViz tools and capabilities necessary to perform 
interdependent lifeline network damage and performance assessment are described in 
this section. 
4.2.2.1 New scenario 
Scenarios can be accepted as individual project workspaces in MAEviz, containing 
necessary and relevant datasets, settings, and fragility information, created to 
perform specific analyses in a specific area. Scenarios are saved and stored locally 
with the information of which datasets are used along with any possible custom user 
input. Scenarios can be published and shared online between MAEViz users. 
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When defining a new scenario, region of interest should be defined from the dialog 
window (Figure 4.7). MAEviz currently supports region information for the entire 
United States, and Istanbul.  
 
Figure 4.7 : New scenario definition window. 
4.2.2.2 Buried pipeline damage 
Buried pipeline damage analysis tool is in the lifeline analysis toolbox. This tool is 
used estimate the expected damage to buried pipelines based on a defined scenario 
hazard. Pipeline damage is expressed as repair rates (repairs per kilometer) in 
accordance to the buried pipeline damage methodology. Required datasets and 
information include: buried pipeline inventory, hazard, fragility, fragility mappings 
(Figure 4.8). If ground deformations are provided with the hazard maps, user may 
choose the “include liquefaction” option to include liquefaction induced damage 
estimation to the analysis. 
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Figure 4.8 : Buried pipeline damage analysis dialog box. 
4.2.2.3 Generate scenario earthquake 
 “Generate Scenario Earthquake” tool is provided within the hazard analysis toolbox. 
It is used to generate a new scenario earthquake hazard map. There are numerous 
required parameters for the calculations depending on the selection. Users first have 
to provide a period spectrum method and an attenuation selection for ground motion 
calculations and to specify the desired method for periods not supported by the 
selected attenuation relation (Table 4.13). Advanced parameters may be required 
depending on the attenuation selection for finer and detailed calculations. The 
advanced parameters include: fault type, dip angle, azimuth angle, rake angle, 
coseismic rupture depth, seismogenic depth, depth of 2.5 km/s shear wave, and depth 
of 1.0 km/s shear wave.  
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Table 4.13 : Attenuation relations available in MAEViz. 
Attenuation Region 
Abrahamson and Silva (1997) Western U.S.A. 
Atkinson and Boore (1995) Eastern North America 
Boore and Atkinson (2006) Western U.S.A. 
Boore et al. (1997) Western North America 
Campbell (2003) Eastern North America 
Campbell and Bozorgnia (2003) Western North America 
Campbell and Bozorgnia (2006) Shallow Crustal Earthquake Regions 
Chiou and Youngs (2006) California 
Fernandez and Rix (2006) Upper Mississippi Embayment (U.S.A.) 
Frankel et al. (1996) Eastern North America 
Kalkan and Gülkan (2004) Northwestern Turkey 
Özbey et al. (2004) Northwestern Turkey 
Sadigh et al. (1997) Western U.S.A. 
Somerville et al. (2001) Central and Eastern U.S.A. 
Spudich et al. (1999) Western U.S.A. 
Toro et al. (1997) Central and Eastern U.S.A. 
Ulusay et al. (2004) Turkey 
Youngs et al. (1997) American Pacific Northwest 
In addition to the attenuation selection, earthquake location must be provided by 
entering directly, selecting from predefined earthquake events of MAEviz (Figure 
4.9), or by selecting from the list of latest earthquakes from USGS records. 
 
Figure 4.9 : Predefined earthquake scenarios in MAEViz. 
Predefined earthquakes are possible events that contain defined parameters like 
moment magnitude, location, etc. Latest earthquakes dialog displays magnitude-1.0 
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or larger earthquakes from the USGS records that have occurred in the last 7 days, 
day, or hour (Figure 4.10). 
 
Figure 4.10 : Latest earthquakes from the USGS records. 
Optional parameters and datasets can also be provided for detailed analysis. Site 
class information can be provided by soil classification maps to adjust the attenuation 
according to soil classes. Site modification factors for short and long periods may be 
provided to adjust the hazard by site class. Liquefaction susceptibility maps can be 
provided to model liquefaction and liquefaction-induced ground deformations. 
Moreover, soil geology, soil depth, and elevation slope maps as optional items 
supported by some of the attenuations to provide more specific and detailed inputs. 
4.2.2.4 Utility network builder 
“Utility Network Builder” tool builds utility network datasets from electric power, 
water, or natural gas data having topological information. Buried pipelines and 
facility structures with topology must be provided for building water and natural gas 
networks; whereas power networks require power lines and facility structures with 
topological information. Necessary link and node schemas are provided by pipeline 
or power line data and facility structure datasets, respectively. The builder requires 
the from and to node information in the link schema to match with the node IDs in 
the facility dataset to be able to build the utility network. 
Required information include: Resulting utility network name, resulting utility 
network type (power, water, or natural gas), link schema (buried pipeline or power 
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line dataset with topology), and node schema (facility structures dataset) (Figure 
4.11). 
 
Figure 4.11 : Utility Network Builder dialog box. 
4.2.2.5 Utility network damage 
Each utility network is provided a specific damage analysis tool depending on the 
utility type. Damage analysis is carried out with Electric Power Utility Network 
Damage, Gas Utility Network Damage Analysis, and Water Utility Network Damage 
Analysis tools (Figure 4.12). 
Analysis data must be utility network datasets built by Utility Network Builder tool. 
Damage estimates of facility structures are calculated following HAZUS 
methodology (FEMA, 2003) using the provided hazard and fragility information. 
Water and natural gas pipeline damage estimates are calculated according to the 
buried pipeline damage analysis methodology described in Section 3.1.3.1. 
Appropriate fragility and fragility mapping datasets must also be provided according 
to the analyzed network dataset. The resulting utility network damage datasets of this 
tool are used as input in interdependent network analysis tool. 
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Figure 4.12 : Utility network damage analysis dialog box. 
4.2.2.6 Interdependent network analysis 
Interdependent network analysis tool requires two utility network damage datasets to 
operate. Electric power network is mandatory in all analyses, hence electric power 
network damage must be provided as one of the analysis datasets. The second utility 
network damage dataset can either be the output of water or natural gas utility 
network analysis depending on the analysis to be performed. Other required inputs 
are the number of Monte-Carlo simulations and the interdependency table between 
the analyzed networks. Figure 4.13 illustrates the flowchart of interdependent 
network performance analysis process with hazard modeling, utility network damage 
analysis, and interdependent performance analysis. 
 
Figure 4.13 : Interdependent network performance analysis process. 
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Within each simulation, a probabilistic failure assessment is performed to determine 
failed network component and the networks are re-structured with their surviving 
elements. Structural failure is checked with the failure probabilities of network 
elements which are calculated in the structural damage analysis phase. A uniformly 
distributed random number between 0 and 1 is generated and compared to the failure 
probabilities of each network component. 
  
                  (  
 ) (4.1) 
where   
  is the structural failure of the i
th
 network component due to earthquake 
damage,           is the uniformly distributed random number, and  (  
 ) is the 
structural failure probability of the component. 
Operational failure of nodes is caused by either due to loss of connectivity on the 
node or due to failure of the feeder nodes which the feeding node is dependent on. 
Operational failure due to loss of connectivity implies the failure of all outgoing arcs 
from a generation node, or the failure of all incoming arcs to a distribution node. 
Operational failure due to loss of connectivity can be described with the following 
equations: 
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(4.3) 
where    
  is the operational failure of the i
th
 node in the network due to loss of 
connectivity,    
    and    
    are the sets of outgoing and incoming arcs at the i
th
 node 
respectively, and    
    and    
    are the failures of the jth node in the sets of outgoing 
and incoming nodes at the i
th
 node respectively. 
Operational failure due to interdependency effect, on the other hand, is determined 
following a similar process as in structural failure assessment. A uniformly generated 
random number is compared to the level of dependency of a node to decide whether 
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interdependency effect governs or not. Additional to the interdependency effect, 
interdependent failure also requires the failure of all feeder nodes in the power 
network which the node is dependent on. Operational failure due to interdependency 
effect can be described with the following equations: 
   
  (⋂    
     
)      (4.4) 
                         (4.5) 
where    
  is the operational failure due to interdependency effect,     is the set of 
power nodes which the i
th
 node is dependent on,     is the failure of the j
th
 power 
node of the set,     is the interdependency effect for the i
th
 node,           is the 
uniformly generated random number to check interdependency effect, and    is the 
level of dependency of the i
th
 node.  
Following the assessment of structural and operational failures, different post seismic 
network states are obtained using the surviving network elements in each simulation. 
Network performance measures are applied to each network to determine CL and SFR 
values. The mean CL, SFR, and their standard deviations are calculated resulting from 
the Monte-Carlo simulations for both independent and interdependent states. 
4.3 Analysis Algorithms 
4.3.1 Monte-Carlo simulations 
Monte-Carlo simulations are utilized in models which operate on a stochastic fashion 
depending on numerous random processes rather than strict and predefined 
processes. During each simulation, a random number is generated for each random 
variable; resulting in a unique outcome in each simulation. A new and different set of 
random numbers will give different results but simulations would yield to an 
expected median within some statistical error. 
An accurate representation of a real life situation by a Monte-Carlo model depends 
on accurate definitions of the random variables, their ranges, and their distributions. 
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An accurate estimate of a Monte-Carlo process additionally depends on thorough 
coverage of the sample space defined by the random variables. This fact points that 
the improvement of simulation results can be achieved by increasing the number of 
simulations, thus extending the sample set (Landau and Binder, 2005). 
Monte-Carlo simulations are helpful for cases where theoretical background is 
present without sufficient physical realization; and the only possible examination of 
the proposed theoretical solution is to achieve data from computer simulations 
(Kochanski, 2005). 
 
Figure 4.14 : Visual explanation of the relation between theory, experiment, and 
simulation by Landau and Binder (2005). 
Theory, experiments, and simulations all aim to represent natural phenomenon 
accurately in order to understand its underlying features and characteristics (Figure 
4.14). This statement can be reinforced by presenting examples where physical 
experiments cannot be considered. Outcomes of a reactor meltdown may be an event 
of interest in nuclear research; however performing physical experiments on the 
subject is improbable. In the case of post seismic performance analysis of large-scale 
interdependent networks, physical experiments based on sensitivity analyses are also 
improbable. Network damage and interdependent behavior can be observed partially 
from extremely limited previous events and can only be tested via computer 
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simulations. Another reason for modeling interdependent lifeline network systems 
with simulations is the extreme complexities of the interacting systems in question; 
making them unaccountable to theoretical models or physical scaled experiments. 
The aim of Monte-Carlo simulations are not data validation and replacement of 
analytical theory; but rather to achieve an understanding of physical systems as 
thorough as possible via examining every feature of the system model in detail 
(Landau and Binder, 2005). 
4.3.2 Breadth-first search algorithm 
Search algorithms are widely applied methods in graphs to solve problems including 
finding all reachable nodes from a specific node, finding all nodes able to reach to a 
specific node, finding all connected nodes of a network, and finding the shortest path 
between two specific nodes. Search algorithms may also provide essential 
information for other problems on graphs such as maximum flow / minimum cost 
flow algorithms (Kim, 2007). 
BFS algorithm is utilized in connectivity loss (CL) analysis in the study since CL is 
related with the existence of paths between generation and distribution nodes. The 
product of a BFS algorithm is a shortest path tree showing the shortest paths to every 
connected node in the network from the starting node (Figure 4.15). This suggests 
that the path from the origin node to any node in the tree must contain the minimum 
number of links compared to every possible path between these nodes (Awerbuch 
and Gallager, 1987).  
 
Figure 4.15 : A shortest path tree resulting from the BFS algorithm  
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The BFS algorithm searched all nodes adjacent to the origin node. The algorithm 
then searches the neighboring unexplored nodes of these nodes until all nodes are 
found. A pseudo-code for the BFS algorithm can be seen in Figure 4.16. If a specific 
destination node is searched, the algorithm stops the search without generating the 
entire BFS tree and returns the result. 
 
Figure 4.16 : Pseudo-code for BFS algorithm (Ahuja et al., 1993). 
4.3.3 Successive shortest path algorithm 
Successive Shortest Path (SSP) algorithm is utilized in minimum cost / maximum 
flow problems where an item is needed to be carried through a network to meet 
demands at the destination nodes by the supplied amount at the origin nodes. Various 
possible applications of the SSP algorithm include distribution modeling of products 
from factories to warehouses, traffic flow in urban transportation networks, or call 
routing in a communication system. In interdependent network performance analysis, 
SSP algorithm is utilized to simulate the network flow in a seismically disturbed 
network considering supply, demand, and link capacities for the surviving 
components (Kim, 2007). Mathematical formulation of the SSP algorithm is an 
optimization problem as follows: 
          ( )  ∑       
(   )  
 (4.6) 
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subject to: 
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   (   )   
 ∑      ( )
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                    (4.7) 
                             (4.8) 
where   (   ) is a directed graph with costs being denoted with     and capacity 
with      for the arcs(   )   .  ( ) represents the supply if  ( )    and demand if 
 ( )    for each node     (Ahuja et al., 1993).   
SSP algorithm operates by maintaining an initial solution called pseudo flow 
satisfying the flow capacity restrictions, but does not satisfy the mass balance 
constraints of the nodes. At each step, a node with excess supply and a node with 
unfulfilled demand are selected and the excess flow is routed to the demand node via 
the shortest path in the network. The cycle continues until the solution satisfies the 
mass balance constraints (Floudas and Pardalos, 2001). A pseudo code for the SSP 
algorithm is given in Figure 4.17. 
 
Figure 4.17 : Pseudo-code for SSP algorithm (Ahuja et al., 1993). 
4.4 Modifications to the Interdependent Network Analysis Algorithm 
During the study, certain changes and modifications have been applied to the 
interdependent network analysis algorithm to improve the network and 
interdependent failure models in order to obtain more accurate representations and 
approximations of physical networks. The most significant modifications in the 
Interdependent Network Analysis tool of MAEViz which was implemented by Kim 
(2007) are the addition of liquefaction induced buried pipeline damage algorithm and 
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the addition of a heterogeneous interdependency model over the existing 
homogeneous model.  
Prior to the addition of liquefaction induced buried pipeline damage algorithm into 
the analysis tool, buried pipeline damage and pipeline failure was assessed only 
using ground shaking induced damage estimates. Existing HAZUS methodology 
(FEMA, 2003) on liquefaction induced buried pipeline damage was adopted in the 
analysis methodology additionally provide liquefaction damage for the estimation of 
repair rates, break rates, and failure probabilities for regions where liquefaction is 
also a concern. 
Kim (2007) implemented a homogeneous interdependency model where all 
connections between two analyzed networks behaved the same way, suggesting 
either complete system independency or complete system dependency. The networks 
were analyzed with uniform hypothetical dependency levels from 0 to 1 in 
increments of 0.25 in each simulation to determine the system behavior. A uniformly 
generated random number is compared to the system dependency to decide whether 
interdependency effect governs in the entire network or not. Determination of the 
interdependency effect is performed according to the following condition: 
                                           (4.9) 
Where    is the interdependency effect,         is the uniformly generated random 
number to check the interdependency effect, and   is the hypothetical dependency 
level of the analyzed network. 
A heterogeneous approach to model interdependencies is adopted in this study as an 
alternative to homogeneous interdependency model. The heterogeneous model 
simulates the interactions independent from each other, enabling assignment of 
different dependency levels to each connection in the interdependency table based on 
local structural or topological settings. The independent behavior of dependency 
interaction, which was defined in Equation 4.5, increases the complexity of the 
model, making it more accurately represent the physical situation by the ability to 
simulate local effects between analyzed networks (Duenas-Osorio, Personal 
communication). 
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A comparison between the old and new algorithms is performed in order to observe 
the differences due to the modified methodology. The analyses are carried out on 
sample water (Figure 4.18) and power (Figure 4.19) network datasets of Shelby 
County, Tennessee which are provided in the sample local data repository of 
MAEviz on installation. They are simplified representations of actual networks with 
their condensed end-user distribution elements removed but with enough links to 
appropriately model the main arterial structures and major feeders (Duenas-Osorio, 
2005). The networks of Shelby County, TN were mainly chosen because of their 
same spatial coverage and their situation of being critical infrastructure under 
earthquake risk.  
 
Figure 4.18 : Shelby County, TN water network for comparison analysis. 
 
Figure 4.19 : Shelby County, TN electric power network for comparison analysis. 
85 
Hazard maps are generated assuming a fictitious earthquake with an epicenter 
randomly placed on 90˚14'45'' W and 35˚30'21'' N in WGS84 coordinates and at 12 
km depth for moment magnitudes 6.0 to 8.0 at intervals of 0.5. Ground motions are 
calculated using the methodology defined by (Frankel et al., 2002) which was used 
for the work involving generation of hazard maps characteristic for Central United 
States (CEUS) earthquakes. The methodology involves using the weighted average 
of five different attenuation relations for the calculation of ground motion parameters 
for a CEUS region, New Madrid and Charleston. The attenuation relations and their 
weights for a characteristic CEUS earthquake is given as: 0.25 for (Toro et al., 1997), 
0.25 for (Frankel et al., 1996), 0.25 for (Boore and Atkinson, 1995), 0.125 for 
(Campbell, 2003), and 0.125 for (Somerville et al., 2001). Before weighting, all 
relations are adjusted by applying site amplification factors in order to correspond to 
B-C boundary site condition for firm rock with VS30 = 760 m/s.  
For the comparison between the homogeneous and heterogeneous approaches, same 
conditions are provided for all analyses. In order to ensure this condition, the hazard 
maps were generated by excluding liquefaction algorithms and four different 
interdependency tables for prepared with constant dependency levels from 0.25 to 1. 
An interdependcy table containing the same connections with random dependency 
levels was also prepared for use with the heterogeneous approach to illustrate the 
analysis output in the presence of known interdependency relations between network 
nodes. Comparison of the results for changing earthquake moment magnitudes and 
dependency levels for 500 Monte-Carlo simulations are tabulated on figures A.1 to 
A.10 in Appendix A.1.The results show that the heterogeneous dependency model 
gives consistent results with the homogeneous dependency model with constant 
dependency levels throughout the system. The figures also indicate that if 
dependency levels of each network component are specified, a more exact estimation 
of network performance is possible. Comparison of the heterogeneous and 
homogeneous dependency levels also provide information on the system 
dependencies. 
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5.  CASE STUDY ON SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE 
Seismic performance analyses of interdependent water, natural gas, and electric 
power networks of Shelby County, Tennessee are conducted as part of a study by the 
MAE Center and funded by FEMA to analyze the impact of New Madrid Seismic 
Zone earthquakes on the Central USA. 
Aims of the analyses can be stated as: assessment of the structural, economical, and 
social impacts of a possible NMSZ earthquake to the Central USA; and application 
of the heterogeneous dependency model within the INA tool and to provide an 
opportunity for the comparison of old and new methodologies. This chapter includes 
information on the analysis inventory and scenario earthquakes, structural damage 
assessment of the lifeline utility networks of Shelby County, TN, interdependency 
definitions between the utility networks, and interdependent performance analysis of 
the topologically modeled networks utilizing both the existing and modified 
methodologies. 
5.1 Analysis Inventory 
The analysis inventory consists of electric power, potable water, and natural gas 
systems of Shelby County, acquired from MLGW (Memphis Light, Gas and Water) 
for use in the “Impact of New Madrid Seismic Zone Earthquakes on the Central 
USA” report by the MAE Center (Elnashai et al., 2010). Shelby County is located in 
the south-western corner of Tennessee, south of the New Madrid Seismic Zone, with 
a total population of 909,035 according to the 2005 US Census. The county contains 
Memphis, the largest city in the New Madrid Seismic Zone; and is a major 
transportation hub with Memphis International Airport being the busiest cargo 
airport in the world (Url-3). 
The electric power network of Shelby County has 28 substations distributing electric 
power to the county to approximately 430,000 customers through 3,666 transformer 
stations (Figure 5.1) with an average power usage of 14,735 kWH per year. 
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Figure 5.1 : Shelby County electric power network. 
Shelby County has 192 water wells, 17 water tanks, 39 water pumps, 27 booster 
stations in the potable water network (Figure 5.2). The potable water pipelines are a 
total 6,961 kilometers long, consisting of 202,294 pipe segments.  
 
Figure 5.2 : Shelby County water network. 
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Water pipelines are predominantly cast iron, consisting of 69.5 percent of the total 
pipelines; while other pipe materials in the network include ductile iron, asbestos 
cement, PVC, and steel (Table 5.1). While specific functions for copper and lead are 
not provided in the fragility sets, ductile iron damage functions were used as an 
approximation given the small amount of copper and lead pipes. This approach 
would produce acceptable results for system-level analyses (O’Rourke, Personal 
communication). 
Table 5.1 : Shelby County water pipelines, pipe material statistics. 
Pipe Material Total Length (km) Percentage (%) 
Asbestos Cement 8.2 0.1 
Cast Iron 4835.5 69.5 
Copper 4.3 < 0.1 
Ductile Iron 1952.7 28.1 
Lead 0.9 < 0.1 
PVC 153.9 2.2 
Steel 5.4 < 0.1 
The natural gas network contains 3 gate stations, 120 pressure regulator stations, and 
9,232 kilometers of main and service pipelines(Figure 5.3) which are providing 
natural gas to approximately 320,000 customers in Shelby County with a capacity of 
40 billion cubic feet per year. The natural gas mains consist of 200,794 segments. 
The service lines, which are also analyzed, consist of 123,115 pipe segments. 
 
Figure 5.3 : Shelby County natural gas network. 
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Natural gas pipelines are predominantly steel, consisting of 58.6 percent of the total 
pipelines; while other pipe materials in the network include polyethylene, cast iron, 
wrought iron, and PVC (Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2 : Shelby County natural gas pipelines, pipe material statistics. 
Pipe Material Total Length (km) Percentage (%) 
Cast Iron 617.9 6.7 
Steel 5408.5 58.6 
Polyethylene 3149.5 34.1 
PVC 3.9 < 0.1 
Wrought Iron 52.2 0.6 
5.2 Hazard 
Earthquakes pose a significant threat to the central United States. Occurrence of three 
major events in the New Madrid Seismic Zone in 1811 and 1812, with estimated 
magnitudes of around 8, reveals the seismic potential of the region. Those events are 
also noted among the largest intraplate earthquakes in the world (Tuttle et al., 2002). 
Densely populated regions like St. Louis, Missouri, and Memphis, Tennessee, are 
expected to be affected by potential future earthquakes in the region. 
5.2.1 New Madrid Seismic Zone scenario 
The New Madrid Seismic Zone has experienced severe earthquakes in the past. 
Geological evidence suggests that at least two major events occurred around A.D. 
900 ± 100 years and A.D. 1450 ± 150 years, similar in size and location to the 1811-
1812 events (Tuttle et al., 2002). Cramer (2001) carried out recurrence interval 
analysis by using the estimated dates to project future New Madrid Seismic Zone 
events. The results were fitted by a log-normal distribution with a median value of 
440 years and a mean value of 498 years. It is suggested that within the next 50 years 
the probability for a magnitude 6.0 or greater earthquake is 25% to 40% and the 
probability of a magnitude 7.5-8.0 earthquake is 7% to 10% (USGS, 2002). The 
direct losses in the region due to a magnitude 7.7 earthquake are estimated to be 
between 50-80 billion dollars (Elnashai et al., 2008). The New Madrid Fault consists 
of three major segments: northeast, central, and southwest, as illustrated in Figure 
.54. Northeast and southwest segments are strike slip faults; and the central segment, 
also called the Reelfoot Segment, is a thrust fault.  
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Figure 5.4 : New Madrid Seismic Zone (Elnashai et. al, 2008). 
Ground motion maps were developed by USGS, which show the estimated potential 
ground shaking for the New Madrid Seismic Zone (Figure 5.5). The maps were also 
used in the FEMA-funded “New Madrid Seismic Zone Catastrophic Earthquake 
Response Planning” project (Elnashai et al., 2008) and in a project to develop 
earthquake damage assessment tools for natural gas transmission and distribution 
networks of St. Louis, MO (Elnashai et al., 2009). Hazard maps are the combined 
maps of the three New Madrid Seismic Zone scenarios of magnitude 7.7, 
representing the simultaneous rupture of the three fault segments, the highest 
potential ground shaking among these three scenarios for a given location. 
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Figure 5.5 : New Madrid Seismic Zone scenario, PGV map. 
5.2.2 Liquefaction susceptibility maps 
Liquefaction can be defined as the event during which a coarse, saturated layer of 
soil subject to long durations of shaking loses cohesion due to increased pore water 
pressure (Elnashai and Di Sarno, 2008). The degree of liquefaction depends on the 
presence of low cohesion sediments like gravels, sands, low-plasticity silts and a 
high water table that causes the sediments to be saturated. The most susceptible 
sediments are relatively younger fills and deposits which become less susceptible 
with increasing age (Idriss and Boulanger, 2008). In the New Madrid Seismic Zone, 
there is strong evidence of severe liquefaction and ground failure within a very large 
region of approximately 3,850 square miles (Tuttle et al., 2002). In order to estimate 
the liquefaction effects, the MAE Center utilized a susceptibility map of Arkansas, 
Missouri, and Illinois (Figure 5.6) with the proxy tabulated in Table 5.3. 
Liquefaction susceptibility was correlated to soil site classes based on the National 
Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP) classification. Although this 
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approach captures the regional ground deformation effects adequately (Elnashai et. 
al., 2008), a liquefaction potential map developed from a greater scaled geology map 
with more local details would provide a more accurate assessment of urban pipelines 
subjected to ground deformations. 
Table 5.3 : Liquefaction susteptibility levels by soil classes. 
Soil Class Soil Description 
Liquefaction 
Susceptibility Level 
A Hard Rock NONE 
B Rock NONE 
C Very Dense Soil & Soft Rock NONE 
D Stiff Soils LOW 
E Soft Soils MODERATE 
F Soils Requiring Site-Specific Evaluation VERY HIGH 
 
Figure 5.6 : Liquefaction susceptibility levels of the New Madrid Seismic Zone. 
5.3 Seismic Impact Assessment 
The New Madrid Seismic Zone scenario earthquake is expected to cause 13500 
repairs in the water pipeline system, and a total of 9000 repairs in the natural gas 
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pipelines. 17500 of the total repairs in the water and natural gas systems are expected 
to be caused by liquefaction effects, whereas approximately 5000 repairs are 
expected to be needed because of pipe leaks (Table 5.4). 
Table 5.4 : Shelby County pipeline damage. 
Shelby County. 
Inventory 
Total 
Pipe 
Length 
(miles) 
PGV 
Induced 
Pipeline 
Repairs 
PGD Induced 
Pipeline 
Repairs 
Total 
Leaks 
Total 
Breaks 
MAEViz Analysis  
Water Pipelines 6960 452 13097 2981 10568 
Natural Gas 
Pipelines 
10837 435 8606 2069 6972 
Spatial distribution of the water pipeline damage indicates heavier damage to be 
concentrated in the north and northwest portions of the pipeline network which are 
located closer to the seismic source (Figure 5.7). The color map also indicates 
heavier damage to pipelines along river beds due to higher susceptibility to 
liquefaction. 
 
Figure 5.7 : Seismic damage to Shelby County water pipelines. 
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Total water pipeline repairs necessary for each census tract of Shelby County was 
estimated via data aggregation. Repair rate and length attributes were used to 
determine the number of repairs necessary for each pipe segment. Following the data 
aggregation process, each census tract was given the sum, minimum, and maximum 
numerical attributes of the pipeline segments with centroids located on them. The 
resulting map (Figure 5.8) suggests higher numbers of repairs in north and 
northwestern census tracts both because of higher repair rates and relatively larger 
areas among the census tracts of the county which contain more pipeline segments. 
 
Figure 5.8 : Repairs for Shelby County water pipelines by census tracts. 
Spatial distribution of the natural gas pipeline damage also indicates heavier damage 
to be concentrated in the north and northwest portions of the pipeline network 
(Figure 5.9). Higher pipeline damage along river beds due to high liquefaction 
susceptibility are more apparent on the color map compared to the water network. 
Total natural gas pipeline repairs necessary for each census tract of Shelby County 
was also illustrated via data aggregation (Figure 5.10).The census tracts with higher 
natural gas pipeline repairs are expected to be the ones in the northwest and 
norteastern parts of Shelby County. However, central regions of the county also 
would require high numbers of pipeline repairs due to liquefaction induced pipeline 
damage.  
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Figure 5.9 : Seismic damage to Shelby County natural gas pipelines. 
 
Figure 5.10 : Repairs for Shelby County natural gas pipelines, by census tracts. 
Network facilities are expected to experience severe damage from the New Madrid 
Seismic Zone earthquake as well. All facilities in the power (Figure 5.11.a), water 
(Figure 5.11.b), and natural gas (Figure 5.11.c) networks are expected to have at least 
50% probability of moderate damage or more because of the NMSZ scenario 
earthquake.
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Figure 5.11 : Seismic damage to Shelby County electric power (a), water (b), and natural gas (c) facilities. 
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5.4 Topological Network Modeling 
As mentioned earlier, geospatial topology defines the interactions between objects 
independent from their geometry. Thus, analytical models can be applied to networks 
without needing spatial configuration. For this purpose, network topologies for 
Shelby County electric power, potable water, and natural gas systems were built.  
Figure 5.12.a shows a portion of the Shelby County water network where lines 
represent pipeline segments and points represent network structures. Connectivity 
and flow models cannot be applied to the dataset without building network topology 
which identifies connecting links and nodes, along with their flow carrying 
capacities. 
 
Figure 5.12 : Topological modeling of Shelby County networks. 
To decrease network complexity and to improve computational capacity, Shelby 
County networks had to be simplified by elimination of pipe sections having 
diameters smaller than a determined threshold value. After the filtering process, 
fragmented segments may appear due to the deletion of branching pipe segments. 
Such segments lying between junctions of at least three pipe segments were 
inspected and merged into a single segment manually before building network 
topology. 
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Following the filtering and defragmentation processes, the resulting dataset 
represents a simplified version of the original network as shown with green lines in 
Figure 5.12.b. Also, network structures were identified and classified according to 
their functions which are referred to determine their roles within the topologically 
modeled network. 
For the topological modeling of the Shelby County electric power distribution 
network, substations were assigned as generation nodes and transformers were 
assigned as distribution nodes. As part of the preparation and simplification process, 
transformers which are located close to each other or located on the same branch of 
the power network were clustered together as one distribution node having the 
distribution capacity of all clustered elements summed together. The links 
representing power lines were assumed to be bidirectional since no specific 
information was provided by the data owner. 
The resulting electric power distribution network consists of 3954 links and 3525 
nodes, 44 of which being generation and 1614 being distribution nodes (Figure 5.13). 
 
Figure 5.13 : Shelby County electric power network. 
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188 water wells within the Shelby County water network datasets were modeled as 
generation nodes in the topological network. 33 pumping plants and 17 storage tanks 
assumed the role of distribution nodes.  
In order to reduce the complexity of the modeled networks, pipe segments smaller 
than 12 inches in diameter were filtered out. The resulting layout of water pipelines 
set the general framework for the topological network building process. The resulting 
potable water distribution network consists of 4137 links and 2886 nodes (Figure 
5.14). 
 
Figure 5.14 : Shelby County potable water network. 
There exist 3 gate stations and 120 pressure regulation stations in the natural gas 
network of Shelby County. In the topologically modeled network, the gate stations 
act as generation nodes, and the pressure regulation stations act as distribution nodes. 
The network was built by filtering out pipe segments with diameters of 6 inches or 
less. The resulting natural gas network consists of 1264 links and 853 nodes (Figure 
5.15). 
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Figure 5.15 : Shelby County natural gas network. 
However, supply, demand, and capacity information that were needed for the 
network modeling was lacking in the water and natural gas network datasets. Flow 
was assumed to be directly proportional to the number of customers, and the unit of 
flow was determined to be customers per day. Numbers of customers for the water 
and natural gas networks were found in the website of the Shelby County utility 
provider company (Url-4). 
Several assumptions had to be made for the topological network modeling process. 
The assumptions are used to complete insufficient information that is crucial in the 
topological model and to achieve approximate outcomes in order to be able to 
perform a complete analysis. For both electric power, water, and natural gas 
networks in this analysis, all links were assumed to be bidirectional, thus permitting 
flow in both directions. All water and natural gas distribution nodes were assumed to 
serve equal amount of customers per day, and all generation nodes in those networks 
were also assumed to produce equal amount of flow. Total demand within the 
network was taken equal to the total number of customers per day, and total supplies 
within the networks were assumed to be 25% higher than the demand. In both Shelby 
County water and natural gas networks, maximum flow occurred at the outgoing pipe 
102 
segment from generation nodes. Pipe segments where the maximum flow occurs 
were assumed to be able to transmit the flow. The cross sectional area of the pipe 
segment corresponding to the maximum flow is assigned a capacity to be able to 
transmit that flow. Capacities of the remaining pipeline segments were proportioned 
by their cross sectional areas accordingly. 
5.5 Network Dependencies 
The ideal way to determine and identify the dependencies between the electric 
power, water, and natural gas networks is to utilize service area information. Certain 
regions are fed by definite distribution nodes and dependency is defined between the 
nodes within the same service area. In the absence of service area information, 
dependencies can be determined via spatial proximity analysis which provides an 
approximation for the physical dependencies. 
Voronoi diagrams are utilized to extract proximity information between two datasets. 
Voronoi diagrams are products of a simple process where all locations within a given 
continuous bounded space are linked to the closest object which belongs to a distinct, 
isolated, and finite set. The individual polygons are formed via the union of 
equidistant lines between adjacent objects. Thus, each polygon contains a single 
object and defines the proximity area of that point. Every vertex in a resulting 
Voronoi diagram has exactly three Voronoi edges. The concept has been discovered 
numerous times by various disciplines and is known by more than one name: 
Voronoi diagram, Dirichlet tessellation, Thiessen polygon, Wigner-Seitz unit cell, 
Brillouin zone. In GIS applications, the method is generally referred as Voronoi 
diagrams or Thiessen polygons (Okabe et al., 1992).  
In mathematical terms, given   non-identical points where       and    
       , the Euclidian distance between any two points within the set,    and    is 
given in the following equation (5.1): 
 (     )   √(     )
 
 (     )
 
 (5.1) 
The region given by ethe following equation (5.2) is referred as the planar ordinary 
Voronoi polygon associated with   . 
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Finally, the planar ordinary Voronoi diagram which is the set of all Voronoi 
polygons generated for all points of the set covering the entire area of interest is 
given in the following equation (5.3). 
     (  )    (  )  (5.3) 
For the Shelby County analyses, only the power distribution nodes were extracted 
from the electric power network to determine power service areas. The Voronoi 
diagram generated by the power distribution nodes was accepted to define the service 
area of each distribution node (Figure 5.16). 
 
Figure 5.16 : Voronoi diagram to define power service areas. 
To determine which electric power distribution node they are dependent on, overlay 
analyses were carried out between the water/natural gas networks and the Voronoi 
diagram generated from the electric power distribution nodes (Figure 5.17). The 
Thiessen diagram of the power distribution nodes was utilized to identify the 
dependencies and generate the interdependency tables. 
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Figure 5.17 : Overlay analysis for the determination of network dependencies. 
Lifeline utility network operating companies in the Central United States which 
contributed to the study by providing data for the analyses were consulted to 
determine water and natural gas network components that are dependent on electric 
power. Professional opinion was sought to identify the component dependencies 
along with their levels of dependency. Figure 5.18 shows the checklist from the 
professionals and their response giving information in dependencies of individual 
components as a result of personal communications with MLGW and CenterPoint 
Energy officials in April 2009. Based on the information given in by the checklists, 
one can draw conclusion that natural gas networks are less dependent to electric 
power than water networks are. 
 
Figure 5.18 : Dependency checklist based on professional opinion. 
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According to the feedback from the checklists, dependencies assigned for specific 
network facility structures are tabulated below (Table 5.5). The key considerations in 
determination of dependency levels were the cruciality of electric power for 
operation, and availability of backup power generator. Also, different considerations 
were made for availability of backup power as present, unavailable, and unspecified. 
In the case of backup power availability, dependency levels are set to 0.25 in order to 
account for the possible failure of backup power generators. In the case of 
availability of fragility functions for backup power generators, the value should be 
changed accordingly with the failure probability of the generator. 
Table 5.5 : Electric power dependencies of network components. 
Network Facility 
Dependency 
Backup Power 
Available 
Backup Power 
Unavailable 
Backup Power 
Unknown 
Water Network    
Water Well 0.25 1.00 0.50 
Water Pump / Booster 0.25 1.00 0.50 
Storage Tank 0.25 1.00 0.50 
Automatic Valve - 1.00 - 
Natural Gas Network    
Gate Station 0.25 1.00 0.5 
Pressure Regulator - 0.25 - 
Automatic Valve - 1.00 - 
* Values in bold were used in the dependency tables of Shelby County analyses. 
Network interdependency tables of water and natural gas networks of Shelby County 
were prepared according to the above determined dependency levels for the analyses.  
5.6 Network Performance 
Interdependent network performance analysis of Shelby County lifeline networks 
were carried out by utilizing both homogeneous and heterogeneous dependency 
models. Additionally, two separate cases were considered in the analyses regarding 
pipeline damage for comparison. In the first case, liquefaction induced pipeline 
damage is considered within the analyses additional to the ground shaking induced 
damage. The second case considers only ground shaking induced pipeline damage 
without liquefaction. For the electric power network, all cases yielded the same 
system performance levels since no network dependencies were defined for electric 
power network components and the power network didn’t contain any pipeline 
segments (Figure 5.19). The Shelby County electric power network is expected to 
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experience a connectivity loss of approximately 43%, and a service flow reduction of 
approximately 2% due to the New Madrid Seismic Zone scenario earthquake 
according to the analyses. 
 
Figure 5.19 : Interdependent performance of Shelby County power network. 
For the water network, system performance levels become saturated around 99.9% 
for connectivity loss and 97% for service flow reduction measures when liquefaction 
damage to pipeline segments is considered (Figure 5.20). Variation on the results 
vary only 1% between differing dependency levels for the homogeneous dependency 
model due to the extensive damage rates on pipeline segments suggested because of 
liquefaction effects.  
Without liquefaction damage to pipelines, analysis results indicate connectivity loss 
of approximately 60% and service flow reduction of approximately 48%. Also, 
variations in system performance between differing system dependency levels via the 
homogeneous dependency model was approximately 15% for both performance 
measures. 
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Figure 5.20 : Interdependent performance of Shelby County water network. 
If the intersection point of system performance assessment results of both 
methodologies is accepted to indicate overall system dependency, Shelby County 
water network turns out to be about 65% dependent to the Shelby County electric 
power network. 
For the natural gas network, system performance levels become saturated around 
93% for connectivity loss and 80% for service flow reduction measures when 
liquefaction damage to pipeline segments is considered (Figure 5.21). Variation on 
the results vary 2% for connectivity loss, and 5% for service flow reduction between 
differing dependency levels for the homogeneous dependency model due to the 
extensive damage rates on pipeline segments suggested because of liquefaction 
effects.  
Without liquefaction damage to pipelines, analysis results indicate connectivity loss 
of approximately 75% and service flow reduction of approximately 64%. Also, 
variations in system performance between different system dependency levels via the 
homogeneous dependency model was approximately 10% for both performance 
108 
measures. Based on the comparison made between homogeneous and heterogeneous 
dependency models, Shelby County natural gas network is about 75% dependent to 
the Shelby County electric power network. 
 
Figure 5.21 : Interdependent performance of Shelby County natural gas network. 
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6.  CASE STUDY ON ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI 
This chapter covers the seismic damage and interdependent network performance 
analysis of the water and electric power networks of St. Louis, MO utilizing the 
proposed heterogeneous dependency approach. The Greater St. Louis Area is the 
most populated region within the New Madrid Seismic Zone, harboring a population 
of 2,828,990 people according to the 2009 estimates of the United States Census 
Bureau (Url-5), necessitating the conduction of seismic impact analyses. The 
analyses were carried out in the premises of the City of St. Louis Water Division 
(will be referred as St. Louis Water hereafter) according to privacy rights of the 
establishment, requiring all processes to take place in computers owned by St. Louis 
Water. 
6.1 Analysis Inventory 
The analyzed St. Louis utility network inventory contains the electric power 
transmission network in St. Louis City, St. Louis, St. Charles, and Jefferson 
Counties; and the water network of St. Louis City.  
The information on electric power networks is obtained from Homeland Security 
Information Program’s (HSIP) 2008 datasets (Figure 6.1). The facilities and power 
transmission lines in St. Louis City, St. Louis, St. Charles, and Jefferson counties are 
extracted from the datasets for the analyses. The power transmission network 
covering these counties consists of 6 power plants, 42 substations, and 3 electric taps.  
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Figure 6.1 : Electric power network of St. Louis, MO. 
Water network information is provided by City of St. Louis Water Division. The 
water pipelines are 1485 miles in total length and consist of 56102 segments. There 
are two water treatment plants, two water reservoirs serving in the St. Louis area 
(Figure 6.2). Howard Bent water treatment plant is to the west of St. Louis, drawing 
water from Missouri River at an average rate of 56 MGD (million gallons per day). 
According to St. Louis Water officials, Howard Bend water treatment plant is 
equipped with a backup power generator. Chain of Rocks water treatment plant is to 
the north of St. Louis, drawing water from Mississippi River at an average rate of 90 
MGD. Chain of Rocks water treatment plant is not equipped with a backup power 
generator; however it draws electricity from two different substations in the electric 
power network. Furthermore, there exists one on-ground concrete tank to the west of 
St. Louis City, and two on-ground steel tanks inside St. Louis City for storage 
purposes. 
111 
 
Figure 6.2 : St. Louis water network (courtesy of St. Louis Water). 
Only steel was specified within the pipe segment GIS datasets. Other materials were 
assigned according to the verbal information given by the City of St. Louis Water 
Division. According to the assumptions by the City of St. Louis Water Division, 
ductile iron segments constitute 15 percent of the unspecified segments and are 
entirely located in the southern parts of the network. The remaining 85 percent of the 
unspecified pipeline segments were assumed to be cast iron with 85 percent of them 
having lead, and 15 percent having mechanical joints (Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1 : St. Louis water pipelines, pipe material statistics. 
Code Pipe Type % (by number of segments) 
2 Steel w. welded joints 0.5 
3 Ductile Iron w. mechanical joints 12.3 
5 Cast Iron w. mechanical joints 12.7 
6 Steel w. riveted joints 0.5 
7 Cast Iron w. lead joints 74.0 
9 Steel w. dresser coupling joints < 0.1 
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6.2 Hazard 
For the seismic performance analyses of St. Louis networks, two earthquake 
scenarios were taken into account in the study. In addition to the New Madrid 
Seismic Zone scenario earthquake discussed in 5.2.1, prehistoric evidence of 
earthquakes in the vicinity of St. Louis led to the inclusion of a local earthquake 
scenario to the analyses (Elnashai et al., 2009). 
The Shoal Creek Scenario is a magnitude 6.0 event in southwest Illinois, 
approximately 60 kilometers east of St. Louis (Figure 6.3). Sand dikes and 
liquefaction evidence along Shoal Creek, a tributary of the Kaskaskia River, points to 
the occurrence of a Mw > 6 earthquake near Shoal Creek in approximately 4520 B.C. 
(Obermeier, 1998). Although seismic evidence suggests the possibility of such an 
event, lack of evidence of other earthquakes prevents any prediction regarding return 
periods or occurrence probabilities of a Shoal Creek earthquake. Like the New 
Madrid Seismic Zone scenario, the Shoal Creek scenario is considered by the USGS 
to be among the regional hazard scenarios for the central and eastern United States 
(Url-6).  
 
Figure 6.3 : Shoal Creek Fault (from USGS). 
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Shoal Creek scenario ground motion maps were developed by (Cramer, 2008) for a 
magnitude 6.0 earthquake in the Shoal Creek region (Figure 6.4), following the same 
methodology used to develop the New Madrid scenario maps. Detailed 
documentation on methodology for generating both of the hazard maps was provided 
by (Cramer, 2006). Maps developed and ingested into MAEViz for the analyses 
include peak ground acceleration (PGA), peak ground velocity (PGV), 0.3-second 
spectral acceleration (Sa), and 1.0-second spectral acceleration (Sa) for both 
scenarios. Following the HAZUS methodology (FEMA, 2003), liquefaction hazard 
and permanent ground deformation (PGD) maps were also developed based on PGA 
and liquefaction susceptibility maps. 
 
Figure 6.4 : Shoal Creek scenario, PGV map. 
6.3 Seismic Impact Assessment 
Based on the structural damage assessment of St. Louis Water network for Shoal 
Creek and New Madrid Seismic Zone scenarios, the Shoal Creek event is expected to 
cause greater pipeline damage, mainly caused by higher liquefaction effects due to 
the proximity of the epicenter to St. Louis. Visualization of buried pipeline damage 
for both earthquake scenarios are presented in Figure 6.5 for all pipe segments of the 
St. Louis water network. 
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Figure 6.5 : Seismic damage to St. Louis water pipelines. 
Shoal Creek scenario is expected to cause approximately 530 repairs on the St. Louis 
water network. Out of these 530 repairs, 130 of them are expected to be caused by 
pipe leaks; and the remaining 400 repairs are expected to be caused by pipe breaks. 
The expected damage caused by the New Madrid Seismic Zone scenario is estimated 
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as 165 repairs on the water network; about 50 of the repairs being caused by pipe 
leaks and about 115 by pipe breaks (Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2 : St. Louis water pipeline damage. 
St. Louis Water 
Pipeline 
Inventory 
Total Pipe 
Length 
(km) 
PGV Induced 
Pipeline 
Repairs 
PGD Induced 
Pipeline 
Repairs 
Total 
Leaks 
Total 
Breaks 
New Madrid Seismic Zone 
Scenario (Mw = 7.7) 
 
 2376 27 138 49 116 
Shoal Creek Scenario  
(Mw = 6.0) 
 
 2376 36 492 127 401 
Figure 6.6 presents the damage state probabilities of the St. Louis water network 
structures. The on-ground concrete water storage tank on west of St. Louis is referred 
as “Reservoir #1”, and the on-ground steel tanks in St. Louis City are referred as 
“Reservoir #2” on the figure. Chain of Rock water treatment plant and the two water 
reservoir located inside St. Louis experience approximately 45% probability of at 
least moderate damage due to the Shoal Creek earthquake scenario. Expected 
damage due to the New Madrid Seismic Zone earthquake scenario, on the other 
hand, is relatively low for the water facilities. All water facilities are expected to 
experience approximately 10% probability of at least moderate damage due to 
NMSZ scenario. 
Power facilities of St. Louis are expected to experience relatively less damage by the 
New Madrid Seismic Zone earthquake scenario than Shoal Creek. The most severely 
damaged facilities by the Shoal Creek earthquake scenario are located at St. Louis 
City and north, with probabilities of at least moderate damage state being as high as 
35%. Damage due to New Madrid Seismic Zone scenario is higher in facilities in St. 
Louis City or south, along Mississippi River (Figure 6.7). 
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Figure 6.6 : Seismic damage to St. Louis water network facilities. 
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Figure 6.7 : Seismic damage to power network facilities. 
6.4 Topological Modeling 
For the analyses, no refinement was carried out for the topological modeling of 
electric power networks since the power transmission system was already building 
up a sparse network. In the power transmission network, power plants were assigned 
the role of generation nodes, substations were assigned the role of distribution nodes. 
Power taps and junctions were modeled as intermediary nodes. Capacity information 
on power plants and substations were specified within the GIS datasets. However, no 
information regarding the capacities of the power lines were provided except their 
geometry. Hence, capacities of links were assigned large enough to be able to carry 
any flow generated within the network. In addition, all links were assumed to be 
bidirectional to allow flow in both directions. 
Topological network for the water system (Figure 6.8) was built by the remaining 
pipe segments after elimination of segments with 12-inch or less diameters. Pipeline 
flow transmission capacities were determined via area proportioning based on 
network supply information. Three lines of 78-inch-diameter pipelines are 
transmitting the flow of Chain of Rocks water treatment plant which has an average 
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supply capacity of 90 MGD. Given that a pipe segment with a diameter of 78 inches 
is able to transmit a flow of 30 MGD, pipe capacities within the network were 
proportioned accordingly by their cross-sectional areas. 
 
Figure 6.8 : Water network of St. Louis, topologically modeled. 
According to the network topology, the water treatment plants were modeled as 
generation nodes, and water reservoirs were modeled as intermediary nodes. Due to 
the abundance of water supply from Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, a flat-rate 
system is present in the region where customers are provided with unlimited water 
for a constant fee. Since there exists no limitations on supply, individual usage 
information of customers are not logged. However, the water system of the city of St. 
Louis is divided into five flat-rate distribution regions the average supplies of which 
are known by St. Louis Water Division. The regions and their average consumption 
rates are given in Figure 6.9. 
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Figure 6.9 : Flat-rate water distribution zones of St. Louis City. 
Given that the distribution information was only available on distribution region 
level, hypothetical distribution nodes were generated for the analysis region (Figure 
6.10). Demands at each distribution node were assigned equally between the nodes 
which belong to the same distribution region. 
 
Figure 6.10 : Water distribution nodes for the St. Louis water network. 
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Dependencies between the electric power and potable water networks of St. Louis 
were assigned according to the information provided in Figure 5.18 and the 
determined levels tabulated on Table 5.5 in the previous chapter. The Howard Bend 
water treatment plant was assumed to be dependent on the closest power substation 
in the datasets with a dependency level of 0.25 given that it is equipped with a 
backup power generator. Chain of Rocks water treatment plant, on the other hand, 
was assumed to be dependent on the closest two substations with dependency levels 
of 1.00 given its lack of backup power supply. 
6.5 Network Performance 
The interdependent seismic performance analysis of St. Louis electric power and 
water networks were carried out utilizing the modified heterogeneous dependency 
model with liquefaction-induced buried pipeline damage considerations are included 
in the pipeline damage assessment. Since only the heterogeneous dependency model 
is applied to the systems without any variation in analysis parameters, only the 
expected system performances in total system independency and user defined 
dependency levels are estimated (Table 6.3). 
Table 6.3 : Interdependent seismic performance estimates of St. Louis networks. 
 CL (%) Std. Dev. SFR (%) Std. Dev. 
Shoal Creek Scenario  
Water Network 
Independent 16.5 24.3 % 35.8 6.6 % 
Interdependent 23.9 27.6 % 37.4 11.1 % 
Power Network 
Independent 5.4 10.6 % 0.1 0.7 % 
Interdependent 5.2 10.0 % 0.3 2.9 % 
NMSZ Scenario  
Water Network 
Independent 3.3 11.9 % 37.1 12.5 % 
Interdependent 7.7 18.1 % 39.2 16.2 % 
Power Network 
Independent 1.8 6.6 % 0.1 0.5 % 
Interdependent 2.6 7.3 % 0.1 0.7 % 
Due to Shoal Creek scenario, connectivity loss (CL) in the electric power network is 
expected to be 5% and service flow reduction (SFR) in the network is expected to be 
less than 1% for St. Louis power networks. CL for the water network is expected to 
be 23.9%; SFR to be 37.4%. While the New Madrid Seismic zone scenario gave 
similar results for the power network with CL 2.5% and SFR less than 1%; CL for the 
water network is expected to be 7.7%, and SFR to be 39.2% for the scenario. 
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7.  MODEL UNCERTAINTIES 
Due to numerous assumptions, simplifications, and discretization of analysis 
parameters, the assessment results contain uncertainties. Given that they would 
significantly influence the decision-making process, it is important to address the 
uncertainties and their influencing agents either quantitatively or qualitatively. 
The interdependent network analysis methodology use input data gathered from 
numerous different sources and the analyses are done utilizing separate analysis tools 
consecutively. Thus, the utilized methodology within MAEViz does not provide 
tools to assess cumulative uncertainty. 
The sources of uncertainty in hazard estimation, inventory datasets, fragilities and 
topological models are discussed in this chapter.  
7.1 Hazard Uncertainty 
The uncertainties during the generation of scenario earthquake hazard maps were 
analyzed by Cramer (2001). A logic-tree of possible alternative parameters was 
developed in the study in order to characterize the earthquake sources within the 
New Madrid Seismic Zone. A Monte-Carlo sampling process was carried out using 
the determined parameters to develop the best estimate hazard maps of the region. 
The logic tree branches of Cramer (2001) are given in Table 7.1 with their weights. 
Due to inadequate understanding of geological and geophysical data, meaningful 
constraints could not be defined for the geological parameters. Thus, geological and 
geophysical parameters were assumed to be exact and were directly incorporated in 
the model. 
Based on the resulting hazard maps, Cramer (2001) stated the largest contributors to 
hazard uncertainty as: the location of the next major New Madrid Seismic Zone 
earthquake, choice of ground motion attenuation relation, the magnitude for the 
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historic 1811-1812 New Madrid Seismic Zone earthquakes, and the return period of 
earthquakes larger than 6.5 in moment magnitude. 
Table 7.1 : Logic tree branches and their weights. 
Catalog lower-bound magnitude (smoothed seismicity)  
Alternative Weight 
M 3.0 1/3 
M 4.0 1/3 
M 5.0 1/3 
Rupture Model  
Alternative Weight 
Characteristic earthquakes on S-shaped pseudo-faults 25% 
Characteristic ruptures on Thrust, NE, W, SW, BL segments 14% 
Characteristic ruptures on BL+SW, SW, Thrust, NE, W segments 14% 
Characteristic ruptures on BL+NE, Thrust, SW, W segments 14% 
Characteristic ruptures on SW, Thrust, NE, W segments 14% 
Characteristic ruptures on ER, Thrust, NE, W segments 7% 
Characteristic ruptures on WR, Thrust, NE, W segments 7% 
No large characteristic ruptures (smoothed seismicity only) 5% 
Recurrence Interval  
Alternative Weight 
496-year mean recurrence 100% 
Magnitude Alternatives  
Alternative Weight 
7.5~8.2 evenly weighted 1/3 
7.0~7.5 evenly weighted 1/3 
7.7 ± 2 (sd) 1/3 
Top of Seismogenic Rupture  
Alternative Weight 
1 km 50% 
5 km 50% 
Bottom of Seismogenic Rupture  
Alternative Weight 
15 km 1/3 
20 km 1/3 
33 km  1/3 
Fault Length Variability  
Alternative Weight 
± 10% in length 10% 
± 15% in length 45% 
± 20% in length 45% 
Magnitude vs. Fault Area  
Alternative Weight 
Wells and Coppersmith global median with 0.24 aleatory sigma 50% 
Somerville and Saikia CEUS relation with 0.1 aleatory sigma 50% 
Attenuation Relation  
Alternative Weight 
Toro et al. (1997) 1/3 
Frankel et al. (1996) 1/3 
Atkinson and Boore (1995) 1/3 
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Hazard maps for Memphis, Shelby County, Tennessee subject to a possible New 
Madrid Seismic Zone scenario earthquake were generated by Cramer et al. (2004) 
based on the Monte Carlo process developed by Cramer (2001). The methodology 
was also applied to the entire New Madrid Seismic Zone with consideration of the 
effects of the Mississippi Embayment sediments on earthquake ground motions 
(Cramer, 2006). The resulting hazard maps for the New Madrid Seismic Zone were 
also used in this study. 
The hazard maps of the Shoal Creek (Mw=6.0) earthquake scenario were also 
provided by Dr. Chris H. Cramer as a result of a series of e-mail communications in 
October, 2008. Although not officially documented by Dr. Cramer, the same 
methodologies and procedures were followed as the New Madrid Seismic Zone for 
the development of Shoal Creek scenario hazard maps. 
7.2 Inventory Uncertainty 
The inventory datasets of the Shelby County and St. Louis analyses are highly 
accurate both geometrically and spatially. Shelby County, TN buried pipeline 
inventory was also accurate regarding pipe material information. However, age 
information on most segments and flow capacity and flow direction information on 
all segments were unavailable. One of the main reasons of this inaccuracy was the 
use of spaghetti data structure on the datasets. With no connectivity information 
provided within the gathered datasets, topology had to be built manually with certain 
assumptions on network flow. 
Although geometrically accurate, pipe material information of the St. Louis water 
network was incomplete. Percentages of each material within the overall network 
were known without their exact locations. The use of dated data also contributes to 
the uncertainty of the analyses. However, possible changes in the inventory would 
most likely involve the replacement or repair of aged and corroded segments with 
newer and structurally safer segments. This would result in more conservative 
structure damage assessment results.  
Due to the uncertainty in flow capacity and flow direction information, all segments 
were assumed to be bidirectional for topological modeling, adopting a conservative 
approach. 
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7.3 Fragility Uncertainty 
Parameterized fragility method by Jeong and Elnashai (2007) considers hazard 
uncertainty information as a parameter during calculation of building damage. 
Hence, hazard uncertainty is propagated into structural damage. However, buried 
pipeline damage is expressed as repair rates via empirical damage functions which 
are based on observed damage from past earthquakes.  
Kwon and Elnashai (2006) state that although empirical fragility functions should be 
more realistic than analytical alternatives, there exist certain limitations. They tend to 
be specific to the particular tectonic and geophysical environment they are derived 
from. Datasets of the empirically derived functions also contain very limited 
information on low ground motion and low damage cases. These limitations are 
generally reduced by aggregating damage information from multiple earthquakes in 
different settings. 
The uncertainty sources during the development of empirical fragility and damage 
functions can be classified as: uncertainties related to observations, variability of 
ground motions, local parameters, judgment of experts, physical simplification, and 
variations in material and geometric properties altering seismic demand and 
capacities (Choun and Elnashai, 2010). 
7.4 Topological Uncertainty 
Several assumptions and simplifications during the topological network modeling 
phase contribute to the uncertainty of the analysis methodology. Utilized topological 
flow model does not account for hydraulic parameters. Most of the added uncertainty 
is caused by incomplete information on the analyzed network systems necessary for 
topological modeling such as: flow rates, flow capacities, flow directions, and 
service areas. 
Additionally, the failure model in the methodology assumes the loss of segments due 
to breaks only. However, the loss of flow due to leaks and breaks are not accounted 
for. The only discharge from the system is assumed to happen on distribution nodes. 
Although loss of flow is expected on broken or leaking segments, the flow is 
assumed to be conserved in the flow allocation phase of the topological analysis. 
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This assumption is expected to result in underestimation of the total loss in water and 
natural gas systems.  
7.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
The effect of changes in the analysis parameters to the assessment results has been 
investigated by performing a sensitivity analysis. As a result of the analysis, the 
parameters which have the greatest influence on system performances will be 
determined. For the analysis, sample water and power networks of Shelby County, 
TN within the MAEViz public data repository were used. 
The investigated parameters for the analysis are: location of the scenario earthquake, 
magnitude of the scenario earthquake, ground motion attenuation relation, site class, 
damage functions, and liquefaction. Default and alternative values for the parameters 
are given in Table 7.2. System performances for the default parameters were used as 
benchmark values for comparison. Runs were repeated by changing only one 
parameter each time, while the remaining parameters were kept at default values. 
Table 7.2 : Analysis defaults and alternative values for sensitivity analysis. 
Parameter Default Alternatives 
Location (WGS84) 90.00 N; 35.10 E 90.10 N; 35.15 E 
  90.20 N; 35.20 E 
Magnitude (Mw) 7.0 6.9 
  7.1 
Attenuation Campbell and Bozorgnia (2006) Abrahamson and Silva (2007) 
  Fernandez and Rix (2006) 
Site Class A Shelby County Soil Map 
Fragility O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) - 
Ductile 
O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) - 
Brittle 
Liquefaction No Yes 
The comparative results for both CL and SFR are given in Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2 
respectively. The results imply that the most influential parameter on system 
performance assessment results is the inclusion of liquefaction-induced buried 
pipeline damage methodology. The results also show that the location of the scenario 
earthquake that would be used for generating the hazard maps is more influential to 
system performance than the earthquake magnitude. The choice of ground motion 
attenuation relation is also important, as it causes the system performance to alter 
even for the same location and magnitude values. Finally, assumption of softer soil 
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types and brittle pipe materials would lead to conservative estimation of system 
performance when no or limited information is available. 
 
Figure 7.1 : Analysis results for CL. 
 
Figure 7.2 : Analysis results for SFR. 
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8.  CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
The research presented in this dissertation involves the assessment of seismic 
damage and post-seismic performance of interdependent lifeline utility network 
systems. The study involves the adoption of an existing analysis methodology which 
is utilized to model post-seismic serviceability of complex infrastructure systems. 
The study also involves modification and improvement of the adopted methodology 
for better representation of physical systems and their seismic behaviors. The 
improved methodology was successfully utilized as part of a comprehensive study 
aiming to assess the impact of New Madrid Seismic zone earthquakes in the Central 
United States (Elnashai et al., 2010). The study provides detailed analysis on both 
structural and infrastructural inventory of the region and a broad socio-economical 
assessment addressed to preparation of mitigation plans. 
The interdependent network analysis methodology was provided as an analysis tool 
in MAEviz, a software environment developed in the MAE Center for utilization in 
consequence based risk analysis studies. With the interdependent network analysis 
tool, the methodology was applied for interdependent analyses between electric 
power and water, or between electric power and natural gas networks. The 
methodology can be examined under two categories: namely, structural and 
topological models. 
The structural model contains the seismic impact assessment algorithms and 
definitions for inventory, hazard, and fragility data. GIS datasets of electric power 
lines, power network utility structures, water pipelines, water network utility 
structures, natural gas pipelines, and natural gas network utility structures constitutes 
the inventory elements. For the hazard component, ground motion datasets for 
selected scenario earthquakes are prepared following a deterministic approach. 
Finally, the fragility component provides information on the behavior of the 
inventory elements subjected to specified ground motions. The outputs of the 
structural model are damage rates and failure probabilities of individual network 
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utility structures. This information can be utilized in several mitigation and response 
planning activities. The outputs are also utilized as input data for the assessment of 
seismic performance of interdependent systems by the topological model. 
The topological model assesses the serviceability of networks via flow and 
connectivity analyses on topologically built network datasets by utilizing graph 
theory. Contrary to the structural model, logical relations between network 
components are of greater importance than spatial information. The methodology 
uses the topological setting of the networks to apply connectivity and flow modeling. 
Furthermore, mutually interacting elements between separate networks are identified 
to define the interdependencies between network systems. The post-seismic 
conditions of the analyzed networks are simulated based on the failure probabilities 
of each network elements which is acquired from the structural damage assessment 
phase. Monte-Carlo simulation techniques are employed in the topological model for 
the performance assessment process in order to account for the randomness of failure 
under seismic conditions. With multiple simulations, multiple possible post-seismic 
network configurations are analyzed to achieve convergence to the average expected 
system behavior. System performance is assessed via two performance measures 
indicating functionality of systems. Connectivity Loss (CL) is utilized to quantify the 
decrease in connectivity between each generation and distribution node of the 
networks after seismic events. Service Flow Reduction (SFR) calculates the system 
supply and demand at each distribution node after seismic events to quantify the 
amount of flow in the system that cannot meet the demand values. 
Kim (2007) identified and suggested several improvements to the interdependent 
network performance analysis methodology to achieve better and more reliable 
assessment results. One suggestion made for further research was the addition of 
urban natural gas networks to the analysis methodology.  With the adaptation of 
water network schemes to natural gas networks, interdependent analysis of power 
and natural gas networks were made possible in the Interdependent Network Analysis 
tool of MAEViz. The research objectives stated by Kim (2007) to address and 
resolve the issues in the methodology needing further refinement and improvement 
in the interdependent analysis methodology were also adopted in this research. In this 
context, first alteration in the model was carried out in buried pipeline damage 
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algorithms. The existing algorithm only calculated pipeline damage induced by 
ground shaking (PGV) as part of the analyses. Existing pipeline damage algorithms, 
also finding utilization in HAZUS, calculating damages induced by ground failure 
and permanent deformations (PGD) as results of liquefaction, fault rupture or ground 
settlement were added to the analysis methodology. This addition also gave the 
opportunity to investigate the effects of liquefaction-induced damage to system 
performances in the model. 
The approach followed by Kim (2007) in order to improve the interdependent failure 
mechanisms was the addition of backup power generators into the probabilistic 
model. However, the system-based approach of the methodology still necessitated 
further improvement on the model in order to achieve the aim to more accurately 
reflect the physical situation. The system-based approach in the interdependency 
model homogeneously dictated the same coupling behavior in every interdependency 
pair throughout the analyzed networks. The component-based heterogeneous 
dependency model adopted in the current study allows each interdependent pair in 
the analyzed networks to behave differently and to have different dependency levels 
to account for possible localized mechanisms which may arise within interdependent 
lifeline utility networks. 
The development and utilization of a heterogeneous dependency model for the 
interdependent network performance analysis methodology provided a detailed 
representation and a more accurate modeling of the complex interactions between 
interdependent network systems. Contrary to the random behavior being accounted 
for on a system level in the existing homogeneous dependency model, the 
randomness of the behavior is applied on a component level in the modified 
heterogeneous dependency model. During a personal discussion which took place in 
2009, Leonardo Duenas-Osorio agreed that the homogeneous dependency model 
would provide a better representation of interdependent behavior of lifeline network 
systems. 
The Interdependent Network Analysis tool of MAEViz only requires the 
identification of interdependent component pairs for the utilization of homogeneous 
dependency model. Interdependent networks are analyzed for different dependency 
levels ranging between none (0) and complete (1) and system performances are 
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assessed for each level. Although the interdependent behavior is modeled via a 
random process, a single parameter decides the behavior of each interdependent pair, 
resulting in a system-wide, homogeneous dependency model. On the other hand, 
utilization of heterogeneous dependency model in the analyses requires also the 
dependency levels for each interdependent pair for the analyzed networks. In this 
approach, each pair is allowed to possess different dependency levels and different 
interdependent behaviors. Thus, it can be said that the heterogeneous 
interdependency model simulates the component simulates the component 
dependencies instead of system dependencies. Moreover, utilization of homogeneous 
and heterogeneous dependency models consecutively over a network would enable 
the determination of total system dependencies.With homogeneous dependency 
model utilized, the Interdependent Network Analysis tool estimates average system 
performances for various dependency levels between 0 and 1, system performance 
decreasing with increasing level of dependency. Utilization of the heterogeneous 
dependency model, on the other hand, estimates a single system performance for the 
given component interdependencies. If the system performance estimates obtained 
from system dependencies and the system performance estimates obtained from 
component dependencies are plotted together, the intersection of the two outputs 
would give dependencies of the analyzed networks (Figure 8.1).  
 
Figure 8.1 : Determination of system dependency from analysis results. 
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For example, the sample water network analyzed in Section 4.4 for the comparison 
of two dependency models can be said to have an average system dependency of 
88% to the sample power network according to the analysis results presented in 
Figures A.1 to A.10. 
The modified analysis methodology was utilized as part of a research presented for 
the analyses of physical interdependent lifeline networks of Shelby County, TN and 
the City of St Louis, MO. Although the analyses were carried out using data acquired 
from the operators of the lifeline systems, there were several factors that may have 
affected the overall accuracy of the assessment results. Regarding both analyses, the 
issues contributing to analysis accuracy can be stated as topological network 
modeling, network interdependencies, and the effect of liquefaction-induced pipeline 
damage. The acquired datasets of the Shelby County networks were converted to GIS 
shapefile format from CAD (Computer-Aided Design) data. CAD format provides 
quite high geometric accuracy opposed to quite low topological information. As part 
of topological network building process, connectivity model was prepared according 
to the geometry. However with the lack of directivity and flow information, all links 
on the network were assumed to be bidirectional. The lack of information on service 
areas, average supply and average consumption also led to assumptions on network 
dependencies and network flow models. With inadequate service area information, 
identification of network interdependencies were made according to spatial 
proximity and demand on distribution nodes was divided equally among distribution 
nodes according to total capacities of generation nodes. Given the consequences, 
physical representation of the Shelby County networks in the topological model was 
achieved in a limited fashion. Regarding the St. Louis networks, analyses of the 
water network were carried out in the presence and under the supervision of St. Louis 
Water officials. This opportunity resulted in relatively easy resolution of various 
issues on inventory modeling, impact analysis and topological modeling. With 
detailed pipeline material, service area, supply, and demand information of St. Louis, 
a better representation of the water distribution system was achieved. Due to data 
availability issues, electric power network of St Louis was included to the analyses in 
transmission network level. The limited available information on the electric power 
transmission system resulted in a relatively lower resolution and a less detailed 
modeling on electric power inventory. In both analyses, effect of liquefaction 
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appeared to be dominant on system performance over interdependency effects. The 
extensive pipeline damage predictions, especially in Shelby County analyses, system 
performance estimates showed saturation for pipeline networks suggesting total 
failure of the system due to structural damage. 
It is possible to follow alternative approaches on topological modeling of networks 
and identification of interdependencies. Without actual usage statistics, demands in 
distribution nodes need to be determined via approximation. If applicable, the 
modeling can be done utilizing the number of customers served per administrative 
unit based on average consumption of various customer types (residential, 
commercial, industrial, etc.). Similarly, the unavailability of service area information 
also requires assumptions and approximations for determination of demand and 
interdependencies. Ünen and Şahin (2011) investigated applicable proximity 
analyses for the identification of network interdependencies. In the lack of service 
area information, suggested proximity analyses for the identification of physical and 
geographical interdependencies are spatial proximity (Figure 8.2.a) or topological 
network proximity models (Figure 8.2.b). 
 
Figure 8.2 : Determination of system dependency from analysis results. 
8.1 Future Studies 
Possible future study recommendations based on the work presented in this thesis are 
provided in this section. The recommendations include: 
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 Improvement of the topological flow model by the inclusion of leaks on 
buried pipeline segments. The loss of pipeline segments are related to breaks 
in the analysis methodology. The post-seismic settings of the networks that 
are built using the surviving network elements operate conserving the flow 
that enters the network from generation nodes. The flow is assumed to reach 
the demand nodes without any loss. However, loss of flow is expected due to 
leakage, and omitting leakage result in underestimation of system losses. 
Thus, addition of a leak model would improve the accuracy of the system 
performance assessment methodology. 
 Utilization of hydraulic flow models. Updating the linear flow model utilized 
in the existing methodology to a hydraulic flow model would provide an 
enhanced representation of network flow provided the accurate physical 
representation of the analyzed buried pipeline networks. 
 Utilization of multimodal network models in the analysis methodology where 
linkages between various forms of utility networks are modeled. The 
multimodal structuring of utility lifeline networks would enable the 
simulation of bidirectional interactions between network components as well 
as modeling of more than two interacting networks. This approach would 
provide more accurate estimates of system performances since the complex 
interactions among lifeline networks would be modeled better.  
 Validation of the interdependent network analysis methodology. Validity of 
the system performance estimates of the analysis methodology is still 
unverified. Given the availability of actually experienced physical damage 
and network performance information belonging to past earthquakes, an 
assessment on the accuracy of the analysis results can be carried out. 
 Utilization of the interdependent network performance analysis methodology 
in socio-economic vulnerability models. Both the structural and 
infrastructural impact and infrastructural performance analysis results can be 
utilized for the development of a social model that would estimate the 
affected population. A comprehensive social vulnerability model making use 
of structural damage and possible shortages on lifeline services can be 
utilized in development of earthquake response plans.  
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Figure A.1 : Comparison of algorithms for CL (Mw = 6.0). 
 
Figure A.2 : Comparison of algorithms for SFR (Mw = 6.0). 
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Figure A.3 : Comparison of algorithms for CL (Mw = 6.5). 
 
Figure A.4 : Comparison of algorithms for SFR (Mw = 6.5). 
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Figure A.5 : Comparison of algorithms for CL (Mw = 7.0). 
 
Figure A.6 : Comparison of algorithms for SFR (Mw = 7.0). 
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Figure A.7 : Comparison of algorithms for CL (Mw = 7.5). 
 
Figure A.8 : Comparison of algorithms for SFR (Mw = 7.5). 
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Figure A.9 : Comparison of algorithms for CL (Mw = 8.0). 
 
Figure A.10 : Comparison of algorithms for SFR (Mw = 8.0). 
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